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ABSTRACT
Conventional  wisdom  in  economic  history  suggests  that  conflict  between  countries  can  be
enormously disruptive of economic activity, especially international trade. Yet nothing is known
empirically about these effects in large samples. We study the effects of war on bilateral trade for
almost all countries with available data extending back to 1870. Using the gravity model, we
estimate the contemporaneous and lagged effects of wars on the trade of belligerent nations and
neutrals, controlling for other determinants of trade. We find large and persistent impacts of wars
on trade, and hence on national and global economic welfare. A rough accounting indicates that such
costs might be of the same order of magnitude as the "direct" costs of war, such as lost human
capital, as illustrated by case studies of World War I and World War II.
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1. Introduction  
What are the true costs of war and how can they be measured? One might consult the records of 
statesmen, the popular press, or the pages of scholarly books and journals, but the approaches to 
this question vary as widely as the precision of the answers. However, it is fair to say that most 
analyses have at least one thing in common: a focus on the direct costs, traditionally measured in 
terms of the loss of life and the resources used to wage war—essentially, men and materiel. To 
this, occasionally, are added costs of lost and damaged property, although the accuracy of these 
figures are much more doubtful. 
  In this paper we examine some major indirect costs of war that have never previously 
been examined, namely the effect of belligerent conflict on the volume of international trade. 
Using  econometric  methods  we  search  for  and  find  a  very  strong  impact  of  war  on  trade 
volumes. Moreover this effect has two important aspects: first, it is persistent, meaning that even 
after conflicts end, trade does not resume its pre-war level for many years, exacerbating the total 
costs; second, the effect has a multilateral dimension and, unlike direct costs, which largely 
effect only the belligerents, trade destruction affects neutral parties as well, generating a negative 
externality.
3 
Our paper is part of the renaissance of research activity on the applied economics of 
international trade. A growing theoretical and empirical literature provides strong support for the 
relation of bilateral trade flows to measures of joint economic activity and costs of trade. These 
so-called gravity model relationships have been utilized as benchmarks from which to assess the 
trade impact of economic disturbances and policy regimes, such as exchange rate variability 
                                                 
1 In conversation with James Ivory in Niger, 1973. 
2 In a speech to civil war veterans in Columbus, Ohio, 1880. 
3 In related literature, Hess (2003) estimated the impact of war on consumption losses directly using 1960–1992 
data. In work independent of ours, Blomberg and Hess (2004) have studied the impact on trade of various forms of 
violence, including war and terrorism. Their data covers only the 1968–99 period; our data covers a much longer 
period including the two great wars.   2 
(Thursby and Thursby 1987), preferential trade arrangements (Frankel, Stein, and Wei 1996), 
and currency unions (Rose 2000).  
The relation of aggregate trade to political disturbances and regimes has received much 
less attention among economists. This area of analysis has generally been considered to lie more 
in the domain of political scientists.
 However, in the political science literature the predominant 
and  most  numerous  studies  have  looked  at  a  putative  reverse  causation—the  effect  of  trade 
(along with other political variables) on the likelihood of conflict among countries. Few papers 
have addressed the question of the quantitative impact of conflict itself on trade. 
On theoretical grounds, wars and other forms of militarized conflict should reduce trade 
among adversaries. Military conflict between countries is often accompanied by the imposition 
of partial or total trade embargoes on the exchange of goods. Conflict may also reduce trade 
flows by raising the costs to private agents of engaging in international business. The empirical 
evidence from the few available studies is mixed, however. Pollins (1989a, 1989b), van Bergeijk 
(1994), and Mansfield and Bronson (1997) estimate gravity models and find that conflict lowers 
trade.
4 In contrast, Morrow et al. (1998, 1999), Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000), and Penubarti 
and Ward (2000) also utilize gravity models, but find that the effect of conflict, though negative, 
is not statistically significant.
5 Time series event studies for selected country pairs have also 
yielded ambiguous results (e.g., Barbieri and Levy 1999; Anderton and Carter 2001). 
In addition to failing to provide any uniform conclusion, these studies suffer from several 
design defects. First, the samples typically are restricted to “politically relevant” cases, defined 
as country pairs involving one or more major powers and/or geographically contiguous states. 
The rationale is to exclude country pairs that are especially unlikely or unable to engage in 
conflict. While this sample restriction limits data collection needs and raises the frequency of 
conflicts in the data set, it introduces the possibility of bias in the selected sample.  
Secondly, these studies do not take account of the possibility that war may have lagged as 
well  as  contemporaneous  effects  on  trade.
6  If  war  resolves  outstanding  disputes  and  creates 
conditions for profitable exchange soon after war’s end, trade may resume rapidly. However, 
depending on the destructive nature of war on production capacity and trading capabilities, it 
                                                 
4 Mansfield (1994) finds an effect of war on trade at the global level: world trade falls the greater the frequency of 
conflict among major powers. 
5 Comparisons across these studies are hampered by methodological differences as well. 
6 Pollins (1989b) is an exception, but only considers a lag of one year.   3 
may take a while to exploit these opportunities. In addition, if the threat of additional military 
actions in the future remains, trade will recover slowly after the cessation of war.
7 Thus, even 
with the end of war, trade may remain depressed for several years thereafter, due to the costs and 
inconveniences of postwar reconstruction, diplomatic tensions, explicit price or quantity controls 
on  trade,  and  other  forms  of  disruption.  How  quickly  and  how  much  trade  rebounds  is  an 
empirical question that should be of interest to understanding the overall effects of conflict on 
trade.  
Thirdly, most studies use pooled, rather than panel, estimators that may not adequately 
control for omitted country- or pair-specific attributes, nor effectively distinguish between the 
effects  of  conflict  on  trade  across  country  pairs  and  the  effects  over  time.  To  combat  this 
problem we turn to a gravity model with panel data using country-pair fixed effects (CPFE) 
estimation, so that identification of the impact of war is conducted entirely in the time dimension 
with full control for any time-invariant pair characteristics.
8 
In our paper we analyze the effect of war and other forms of militarized conflict on 
international trade. A data set covering a large number of countries over the period 1870–1997 
enables  estimation  of  this  effect  across  time  as  well  as  across  countries.  By  comparing  the 
bilateral trade among belligerent and neutral countries during and after conflicts (holding fixed 
other factors), we estimate the contemporaneous and lagged effects of war on trade. We then use 
these  coefficient  estimates  in  various  counterfactual  experiments  to  calculate  the  aggregate 
effects  of  conflict  on  world  trade,  particularly  the  costs  of  the  two  world  wars  of  the  20th 
century. 
Finally, we also make an estimate of the welfare costs of these trade shocks using an 
income metric. These costs are then compared to traditional direct costs, such as the valuations 
of the loss of life. We find that the costs of war due to trade disruption, although typically 
ignored, appear to have been relatively large. 
                                                 
7 An exception is when victorious countries choose to help rebuild the economies of the losers after war, as in the 
case of the Allied treatment of Germany and Japan after World War II. 
8  The  reliance  on  pooled  estimation  techniques  also  complicates  analyses  of  the  reverse  direction  of  causality 
between conflict and trade. Consequently, the conflict literature appears better able to answer the question of which 
countries engage in conflict rather than when countries engage in conflict, a point to which we shall return.    4 
2. Methodology and Data 
Gravity Model Methodology 
The effects of war on international trade are estimated using a conventional gravity model of 
international trade, which is now the benchmark empirical model for this kind of exercise.
9 In 
this model we specify the average level of trade between any two countries as a function of the 
log distance between them, the log of the product of their GDPs, and other control variables, as 
well as the current and lagged effects of countries at war: 
 
ln(Tradeijt) = b0 + Sk gkWarij,t–k Sk lkNeutralij,t–k + b1ln(YiYj)t + b2ln(YiYj/PopiPopj)t  
+ b3lnDistij + b4Langij + b5Borderij + b6Landlij + b7Islandij +b8ln(AreaiAreaj)  
+ b9CurColijt + b10Colonyij + b11CurUijt + eijt 
 
where i and j denotes countries, t denotes time, and the variables are defined as: 
 
·  Tradeijt , the average value of real bilateral trade between countries i and j at time t; 
·  War is a binary variable which is unity if i and j were engaged in a war against each other 
(directly or via colonial relationships) in period t–k, k = 0, 1, …M; 
·  Neutral is a binary variable which is unity if either i or j is neutral while the other is engaged 
in a war against some third country in period t–k, k = 0, 1, …M; 
·  Y is real GDP; 
·  Pop is population; 
·  Dist is the (great circle) distance between the capital cities of i and j; 
·  Lang is a binary variable which is unity if i and j have a common language; 
·  Border is a binary variable which is unity if i and j share a land border; 
·  Landl is the number of landlocked countries in the country-pair (0, 1, or 2); 
·  Island is the number of island nations in the pair (0, 1, or 2); 
·  Area is the land mass of the country; 
·  CurCol is a binary variable which is unity if i and j are colonies at time t or vice versa; 
                                                 
9 Gravity models have been much discussed in the literature. Frankel (1997) provides a thorough review of the 
model; Rose (2000) provides references.   5 
·  Colony is a binary variable which is unity if i ever colonized j or vice versa; 
·  CurU is a binary variable which is unity if i and j are engaged in a currency union at time t; 
·  gk , lk, bi are coefficients; and 
·  eij represents the myriad other influences on bilateral trade, assumed to be well behaved. 
 
The coefficients of main interest to us are gk and lk. The former describe the impact of war on 
log trade levels for adversary country pairs; the latter describes the same impact on adversary-
neutral country pairs. The contemporaneous effect of war among countries at war with each 
other is captured by g0, while the lagged effects of a war ending k periods previously is captured 
by  gk  ,  k  =1,…M,  where  M  is  the  maximum  lag  length.  l0  and  lk  analogously  capture  the 
contemporaneous and lagged effects of war on trade between belligerents and neutral countries.
10  
The model is estimated with a number of techniques below. However, we generally rely 
on the robust fixed effects “within” estimator, which essentially adds a set of country-pair fixed 
effects (CPFE) or intercepts to the equation and controls for omitted country characteristics that 
do  not  vary  across  time,  including  any  time-invariant  component  of  multilateral  resistance 
(Anderson and van Wincoop 2004). Regrettably, serious data limitations, including a severely 
unbalanced dataset over more than a century, preclude the inclusion of a fully-specified, time-
varying  multilateral  resistance  term.  We  also  include  historical  measures  of  currency 
arrangements to examine the effects of a common currency post-1945 and the gold standard pre-
1945 (cf. Glick and Rose 2002; Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Taylor 2003). 
Dataset 
The bilateral trade data were assembled  from three main sources:  (i) the  IMF “Direction of 
Trade”, (ii) Barbieri (1996), and (iii) Mitchell (1992, 1993, 1998).  
The  IMF  “Direction  of  Trade”  (DoT)  data  cover  bilateral  trade  between  217  IMF 
country-code geographical units between 1948 and 1997 (with many gaps). Bilateral trade on 
FOB exports and CIF imports is recorded in U.S. dollars; trade is deflated by the U.S. CPI (based 
to  1985).
  Since  exports  and  import  figures  may  be  available  from  both  countries,  there  are 
potentially four measured bilateral trade flows: exports from i to j, exports from j to i, imports 
                                                 
10 In the case of multi-year wars, the lags of war are dated from the last year of the conflict. We assume that for a 
war ending at time t, if a new war occurs at time t’ > t, the values of the war variable lags of the first war are “reset” 
to zero at the time the subsequent war begins, i.e., Wart–k = 0 for k ³ t’-t .    6 
into i from j, and imports into j from i. An average value of bilateral trade between a pair of 
countries  is  created  by  averaging  all  of  the  four  possible  measures  potentially  available. 
Observations where all four figures have a zero or missing value are dropped from the sample.
11 
The Barbieri (1996) dataset contains bilateral trade data in current U.S. dollars for some 60 
countries  during  the  period  1870–1947.
12  Her  data  typically  measure  bilateral  trade  between 
countries i and i by summing imports into i from j and into j from i; we divide these figures in 
half to construct an average value of bilateral trade. The figures are deflated by the U.S. CPI 
index.  We  used  data  from  Mitchell  (1992,  1993,  1998)  to  fill  out  the  sample  with  missing 
observations among major trade partners during the period 1870–1947 and to correct obvious 
errors in Barbieri’s data. These data are typically reported in local currency units. We converted 
them into current U.S. dollar terms using available exchange rate data and then deflated them by 
the U.S. CPI. Further details are in the Data Appendix. 
To this dataset, a number of other standard variables are added to estimate a gravity 
model;  these  include  real  GDP,  population,  and  various  country-pair  characteristics,  such 
contiguity, distance, etc. Real GDP and per capita GDP data (in constant 1985 dollars) for the 
1948–97 period are obtained from three sources. Wherever possible, data from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators (from the 2000 CD-ROM) are used. When the WDI data are 
unavailable, missing observations are filled in with comparables from the Penn World Table 
(PWT) Mark 5.6, Maddison (1995)
13, and (when all else fails) from the IMF’s International 
Financial  Statistics.
14  For  the  1870–1947  period  we  draw  primarily  on  data  from Maddison 
(1995; 2001), supplemented by information from Mitchell (1992, 1993, 1998) and individual 
country sources. The resulting series are then put into constant 1985 dollars and linked to the 
1948–97 series. (See the Data Appendix.) 
The CIA’s World Factbook is used to provide a number of country-specific variables, 
including latitude and longitude, land area, landlocked and island status, physically contiguous 
                                                 
11 These data are essentially the same as that used by Glick and Rose (2002).  
12  We  use  version  1.1  of  Barbieri’s  International  Trade  dataset  obtained  from  the  webpage 
http://pss.la.psu.edu/trd_data.htm. These data actually extend to 1992; we rely on the original source data reported 
by the DoT for the 1948–1997 period. 
13 Maddison calculates his historical series on GDP and GDP per capita for constant 1990 territorial areas and 
borders. Whenever possible we make adjustments to GDP to take account of territorial size changes due to wars, etc. 
See the Appendix for details. 
14 The IFS-based series are calculated by converting national currency GDP figures into dollars at the current dollar 
exchange rate and then dividing by the U.S. CPI.   7 
neighbors, language, colonizers, and dates of independence.
15 These are used to create great-
circle distance and the other controls. Whenever appropriate, we make changes in land area to 
reflect territorial changes based on historical sources.  
For the 1948–97 period we use the currency union variable constructed by Glick and 
Rose (2002), defined as country pairs for which money is interchangeable at 1:1 par for an 
extended period of time.
16 For the pre-1948 period, we set CurU equal to one for counties on the 
gold  standard,  allowing  for  a  similar  currency  effect,  following  Estevadeordal,  Frantz,  and 
Taylor (2003), and using data on gold standard arrangements from Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
17 
Our measure of war is constructed from the database on militarized interstate disputes 
(MID) collected by the Correlates of War Project (COW) at the University of Michigan. We use 
Maoz’s dyadic data set DYMID1.1, a revised version of the COW dataset MID2.1 compiled by 
Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996).
18 This data set codes the level of hostility reached in a given 
country’s conflict with an opposing state(s), where 2 = “threat of force”, 3 = “display of force”, 4 
= “use of force” (short of war, but including formal declarations of war not accompanied by 
fatalities), and 5 = “war.” We code our war variable as conflicts with hostility level 5 (which 
generally involve conflicts with more than 1,000 battle deaths), as well as declarations of war 
(hostility level 4, and HiAct = 20).
19 The data set is extended from 1992 through 1997 with 
information  on  “Major  Episodes  of  Political  Violence,  1946–1999”  from  the  University  of 
Maryland’s Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) and The Statesman’s Yearbook.
20 Countries at war 
with a colonial power are treated as being at war with its current colonies, i.e., if country pair i-j 
are at war, and j-k are in a colonial relationship, then i-k are also assumed to be at war. 
                                                 
15 The website is: http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook. 
16 Hard fixes at non 1:1 rates (such as those of Hong Kong, Estonia, or Denmark) do not qualify as currency unions 
under this definition. 
17 On the gold standard and trade see also Flandreau and Maurel (2001) and López-Córdova and Meissner (2003). 
18 The website for the Maoz dataset is http://spirit.tau.ac.il/zeevmaoz. 
19 The COW data set arbitrarily limits the length of conflict at six months for countries that declared war but did not 
actually fight against their declared adversaries (e.g., various Latin American countries declared war against the 
Axis powers, but did not actually send troops to the war theaters). We assume that countries declaring war during 
World Wars I and II were at war until the state of war was formally revoked or the declared adversary was deemed 
defeated. “HiAct” is short for “highest action in dispute.” This is an index representing the type of conflict and 
supplements the 1–5 hostility level index; the higher the number, generally, the more intense the conflict. See the 
MID codebook at http://cow2.la.psu.edu. 
20 The CSP webpage is http://members.aol.com/CSPmgm/cspframe.htm. We also cross-checked our conflict coding 
with the 3.0 version of the COW dataset, which was released after our dataset was assembled; no changes were 
deemed necessary. Extending the sample beyond 1997 would have little effect since there have been no major wars 
until the U.S. actions in Afghanistan in 2001 and Irqa in 2003.    8 
Table  1  presents  some  summary  statistics  on  the  number  of  observations  and  the 
frequency of war for the full sample 1870-1997, as well as for the two subsamples 1870-1938 
and 1939-1997. These statistics are conditional on the availability of data on bilateral trade and 
GDP, the main constraints for the inclusion of observations in our gravity model estimation.  
Our full sample contains 251,905 bilateral trade observations involving 172 countries and 
11,535 different country pairs. Not surprisingly, the bulk of these observations are in the later 
sample, as the number of countries proliferated and more data on trade and GDP has become 
available. War is a relatively infrequent occurrence in our sample. Conditional on the availability 
of contemporaneous trade and GDP data, only 75 different country-pairs with 206 country–year 
observations (since a conflict involving a particular pair may last more than one year) involve 
war adversaries. However, many countries at war lack contemporaneous trade and/or GDP data 
while engaged in conflict. When we extend the count by including observations of (up to 10 
years of) lagged war, while still conditioning on trade and GDP data availability for these years, 
the number of country-pairs at war in the sample rises to 338. Correspondingly, the number of 
pair-year observations rises to 2143, amounting to 0.85% (=2143/251905) of the total sample. 
While the frequency of war observations in the pre-World War II period is somewhat higher 
(2.97%  =  410/13804),  wars  are  still  rare  events.  It  is  worth  noting  that  even  though  major 
conflicts are infrequent, most countries in the sample have been involved in war at one time or 
the other. Of the 172 countries, over 60% (104) have been engaged in war sometime during our 
sample period. We now proceed to show that wars, while relatively infrequent, have had large 
effects on trade.  
3. Gravity-Based Estimates of the Effect of War on Trade 
Benchmark Estimates 
We begin by estimating our gravity equation using a country-pair fixed effect (CPFE) panel 
estimator (with a full set of year-specific intercepts added). Standard errors are clustered at the 
country-pair level to address potential problems of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the 
error terms.
21 The War dummy is allowed to enter contemporaneously and with up to ten yearly 
                                                 
21  Clustering  at  the  country  pair  level  allows  the  variance  to  differ  across  pairs  and  permits  an  unstructured 
covariance  within the clusters to control for correlation across time. Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) 
suggest clustering as the best way to handle autocorrelation in panel differences-in-differences estimation, which can   9 
lags (denoted War1 to War10). The Neutral variable is initially excluded from the regressor list. 
Results are presented in Table 2 (the fixed effects for pairs and years are not reported). Since 
some traditional gravity variables like distance, shared land borders, or island status, are both 
time-invariant  and  pair  specific,  they  are  collinear  with  the  pair  fixed  effects  and  drop  out. 
However, they will reappear in alternative specifications that we employ for robustness checks 
later on. 
The model proves successful on a number of different dimensions. The model fits the 
data well, explaining almost one-half of the variation in bilateral trade flows. The added control 
variables are economically and statistically significant with sensible interpretations. For instance, 
economically larger and richer countries trade more. A common currency encourages trade, as 
does a common, ongoing colonial relationship. 
The key variables of interest in this paper are the gk estimates of the “trade destruction” 
impact of war. The fixed effect “within” estimator measures gk by comparing trade for a pair of 
countries at war to trade for the same pair of countries when not at war. It exploits variation over 
time and answers the time series question: “What is the effect on trade (now and in the future) of 
a country being at war?” The coefficients indicate that the contemporaneous and lagged effects 
on  trade  are  all  negative,  with  significant  effects  persisting  for  8  years  or  more.  The 
contemporaneous effect is –1.78, implying that trade between two adversaries at war falls by 
over 80 percent (since 1–e
–1.78 » .83), relative to its peacetime prewar counterfactual level, a very 
large  reduction.  Once  the  war  ends,  the  extent  of  trade  destruction  declines  monotonically 
overtime, and trade returns to its “normal” prewar level about a decade later. Trade is still 42% 
below the prewar level five years after the cessation of war and 21% below even after eight 
years.
22  These  effects  are  economically  large  and  generally  statistically  significant  at 
conventional levels. Dropping the year dummies implies slightly larger effects. 
Robustness Checks: Different Estimators, Subperiods, and Regressors  
To provide some sensitivity analysis, the basic methodology is perturbed in a number of different 
ways. Table 3 reports the robustness of the results to alternative estimators: (i) a random effects 
                                                                                                                                                             
be viewed as a variant of fixed-effect panel estimation; this approach has been followed in other applications of 
CPFE (see, e.g., Klein and Shambaugh 2005). 
22 Since 1–e
–.55 » .42 and 1–e
–.24 » .21. For lags one to five the coefficients average –.99, implying 1–e
–.99 » .63, 
while for lags six to ten they average –.19, implying 1–e
–.19 » .18.   10 
panel estimator (which assumes the disturbances are uncorrelated with the random country-pair 
specific  effects);  (ii)  a  maximum-likelihood  estimator;  (iii)  an  OLS  estimator  applied  to  the 
pooled data, with standard errors robust to clustering for common country-pair observations; and 
(iv) an OLS estimator employed with individual country dummies rather than pair dummies. The 
last specification is now commonplace in gravity modeling, since, rather than using up degrees 
of  freedom  with  a  full  set  of  time-country  interactions,  it  provides  a  consistent  estimate  of 
“average treatment effects” for other controls (like war) even when the multilateral resistance is 
time varying (Feenstra 2002). To conform with the specification of the so-called “theoretical” 
gravity model, this case also constrains the coefficient on the product of GDPs to unity, thus 
effectively redefining the dependent variable as the (log) ratio of bilateral trade to GDP. Year 
dummies  are  included  in  all  cases.  The  results  of  Table  3  show  that  the  g  estimates  are 
reasonably  insensitive  to  all  of  these  different  estimators.  The  war  effects  remain:  they  are 
consistently large economically, and statistically significant throughout. 
We next perturb the model by dividing the sample into two subperiods (1870–1938 and 
1939–1997) and also by isolating the effects of World War I and World War II from other wars. 
The results are reported in Table 4. The results for the full sample from the first column of Table 
1 are presented in the first column of Table 4 as a benchmark for comparison. A country-pair 
fixed effect (CPFE) estimator is employed in all cases. We observe that the effects of wars are 
negative  in  both  sample  subperiods,  with  the  contemporaneous  effects  slightly  higher  (in 
absolute value), but the lagged effects decaying more rapidly, in the 1870–1938 period than in 
the 1939–1997 period. In the first period, a significantly negative effect of war on trade lasts only 
four years, compared to nine years in the latter period. Focusing on the effects of the two World 
Wars alone indicates that their effects on trade are larger than that of other wars. The estimated 
contemporaneous coefficient for World War I of –3.02 implies a decline in trade of 95%; the 
corresponding coefficient for World War II of –2.74 implies a similarly high decline in trade of 
94%.  In  the  major  wars,  it  would  appear  that  trade  between  adversaries  was  almost  totally 
destroyed. 
Table 5 augments the results in Table 4 by including the effects of war on trade between 
belligerents  and  neutral  countries,  where  these  pairs  are  identified  by  the  dummy  variable 
Neutral.  As  with  the  War  variable,  persistent  effects  are  admitted  via  ten  lags,  Neutral1  to 
Neutral10. Inclusion of the neutrals does not change the economic and statistical significance of   11 
the war effects. The coefficient magnitudes on trade among adversaries are essentially unaffected 
relative to prior estimates, but the negative coefficients on the Neutral variables imply that war 
also depresses trade between belligerents and neutrals. For the full sample, in Table 5, Column 1, 
trade with neutrals declines by 12 percent (»1–e
–0.13) in wartime, and the negative effect of war 
on trade for these pairs persists with a lag for up to seven years with statistical significance. 
Inspection of the subperiod results reported in the other columns of Table 5 reveals the same 
basic pattern, though the contemporaneous effect on neutrals for the 1870-1938 period appears to 
be somewhat smaller.  Isolating the effects of  World War  I and  II  alone shows much larger 
effects on trade between neutrals and belligerents. The estimated contemporaneous coefficient 
for World War I of –0.54 implies a decline in trade of 42%; the corresponding coefficient for 
World War II of –1.06 implies a similarly high decline in trade of 65%.  
These results lead to the first major conclusion of this paper: historically, wars have been 
very  damaging  for  world  trade.  As  might  seem  obvious,  war  depresses  trade  between 
belligerents, but we can provide an estimate of this effect and it is very large: a decline in trade 
of about 80 to 90 percent. Moreover, war creates negative externalities on trade even for neutral 
countries: their trade with belligerents is also adversely affected, being subject to a decline of 
about 5 to 12 percent. Lastly, both of these effects persist for almost ten years, as shown in 
Figure 1 (based on the coefficients in column 1 of Table 5). 
In practice, what has this meant for the impact of wars on the world economy? Small 
wars involve few belligerents but many neutrals. These are likely to have a large global effect 
only if the belligerents are large countries. But the major wars in history have had catastrophic 
impacts  on  world  trade:  the  belligerents  accounted  for  a  large  share  of  world  trade—with 
themselves and with neutrals. To illustrate the potential magnitude of these effects we look at the 
two World Wars as case studies using our model in Section 4. Before doing so, we conduct a 
final robustness check by addressing possible concerns about the endogeneity of war and trade. 
Robustness Check: Simultaneity Concerns 
The analysis till now has treated the occurrence of wars and conflict as events that are exogenous 
to trade. What if trade and war are endogenously related to each other? That is, trade may depend 
on war, but the occurrence of wars may depend directly on the trade interdependence between 
members of a country pair. In fact, there is a vast political science literature that addresses the   12 
question  of  how  the  likelihood  of  conflict  among  nations  depends  on  various  measures  of 
economic interdependence, including the level of bilateral trade or trade openness, in addition to 
various geographic and political regime variables.  
On both theoretical and empirical grounds, the effect of trade on conflict in the political 
science literature is generally mixed. The “realist” view argues that trade may create conflict by 
intensifying  competition  and/or  increasing  dependence  on  strategic  goods.  Opposing  “liberal 
peace”  proponents  argue  that  trade  interdependence  deters  conflict  and  promotes  peace  by 
generating economic benefits and raising the costs of conflict. Barbieri (1996, 2002) and Beck, 
Katz, and Tucker (1998) find either a positive or negligible effect of trade on the likelihood of 
conflict, while Polachek (1990), Oneal and Russett (1997, 1999) and Mansfield and Pevehouse 
(2000) find evidence that trade reduces conflicts.
23 
Nonetheless, in our case we have reason to believe that simultaneity is not a serious 
problem for our gravity model results. Before we present the evidence, we offer the following 
intuition. Most of the evidence of a significant effect of conflict on trade involves cross-pair 
variations in the data, not with-in pair time effects. The former is of no concern to us since we 
use country-pair fixed effects throughout our analysis. Whether a given country pair is more or 
less likely to engage in war is factored out through that fixed effect. Our identification of the 
effect of war on trade is purely in the time dimension. Since levels of trade between countries are 
very  slowly  varying  over  time  (and  to  a  large  degree  explained  by  slowly-changing  or 
unchanging covariates such as country size and distance), the use of trade levels to forecast a war 
is a priori a hopeless cause. Trade measures may tell us something about which pairs are more or 
less likely to go to war; they tell us nothing about when those countries will actually go to war. 
To establish this result, we proceed by estimating a model of the likelihood that country 
pairs  engage  in  war.  The  likelihood  of  war  is  specified  as  a  function  of  bilateral  trade 
dependence, as well as of common land borders (Border), joint alliance membership (Alliance), 
                                                 
23 For a survey of the political science literature on the links between trade and conflict, see Barbieri and Schneider 
(1999), Reuveny (2000), and the papers in Mansfield and Pollins (2003). Many of these results in this literature 
appear to be sensitive to the exact measures of trade, the sample used, and whether any controls are applied to 
measure not only the level of bilateral trade levels, but also its symmetry and its importance to the countries in 
question. Barbieri (2002) argues that the basic liberal position is an illusion, but finds that trade asymmetry matters. 
Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2005) using a 1948–2001 sample period have recently reported that countries trading 
more bilaterally have a lower probability of conflict, while countries that are more open to trade overall have a 
higher probability of war because multilateral trade openness decreases dependence on any given country.   13 
major power status of one or more of the pair (MajPower), and the number of years of peace 
(YrsPeace): 
 
Warijt = ￿0 + ￿1ln(Tradeij/YiYj)t-2 + ￿2Borderij + ￿3Allianceijt-2  
+ ￿4MajPowerij + ￿5YrsPeaceij,t-2 + eijt 
 
Countries  that  trade  more  bilaterally  should—if  the  liberal  argument  holds—have  a  lower 
likelihood of war because of the opportunity cost associated with the loss of trade gains. The 
likelihood  of  conflict  should  be  greater  for  adjacent  countries,  since  contiguity  and  closer 
geographic proximity facilitate confrontations over such matters as land borders. The likelihood 
of conflict should also be greater for countries participating in alliances. The expected effect of 
major power status is a priori ambiguous. On the one hand, major-power states are more likely to 
engage in military conflict since they have wide-ranging interests that potentially bring them into 
conflict with a large number of states. On the other hand, their military capabilities may work to 
discourage actual conflict.  
We measure bilateral trade dependence as the log of bilateral trade relative to the product 
of the pair country GDPs. MajPower is a dummy variable =1 if any member of the pair includes 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan, or USSR/Russia. The Alliance 
variable is a binary dummy based on data from the Correlates of War project, which codes three 
types  of  alliance  pacts  in  order  of  decreasing  level  of  commitment:  1  =  defense,  2  = 
nonaggression/neutrality, 3 = entente. We code Alliance = 1 when ever countries are linked by 
any of these forms of alliance.
24 Given the binary nature of conflict observations, the probability 
of conflict among any particular country pair should also depend on how long since the pair has 
previously  been  in  conflict.  To  control  for  this  temporal  relation  we  include  the  variable 
YrsPeace that measures the number of years since the previous war between the pair.
25 Time 
                                                 
24 Our data source is the file “AllianceData_July2000.txt” distributed by the Expected Utility Generation and Data 
Management Program (EUGENE), v 2.013, available from the website: http//eugenesoftware.org. This file extends 
the original COW data from 1984 to 1992. We have augmented the dataset to include missing members of the Arab 
League, Council of Independent States, Gulf Cooperation Council, Organization of African Unity, Organization of 
American States, and Organization of East Caribbean States. We assume that all alliance relationships in effect in 
1992 extend through 1997. 
25 For countries in existence in 1870 the years of peace variable begins counting from 1812 or the most recent 
occurrence of war prior to 1870. Former colonies and other states newly independent after 1870 “inherit” the war 
memory of their parent colonizers.    14 
varying variables are lagged two years to limit simultaneity issues. A full set of year dummies 
are also used in our specification.
26  
Table 6 presents estimates of the war model using pooled logit and conditional fixed 
effect  panel  logit  estimators.  Standard  errors  robust  to  clustering  for  common  country-pair 
observations are provided throughout. We report results for the full sample 1870-97, and for the 
subperiods 1870-1938 and 1939-1997.  
The pooled logit results reported in the first three columns indicate that the likelihood of 
conflicts increases when country pairs are contiguous, decreases when an alliance relation exists 
or a major power is involved, and decreases the longer the period of peace between any pair of 
countries (the coefficients for YrsPeace are divided by 100 to improve readability of results); 
these effects are all statistically significant, typically at better than 1 percent, for the full sample 
and  the  more  recent  subperiod.  Most  importantly,  Table  6  indicates  that  trade  dependence 
significantly decreases the risk of war at better than 1% for the full sample as well as both 
subperiods. This suggests that there may indeed be some reverse causality between the extent of 
bilateral trade relations and the possibility of war. 
The results with country-pair fixed effects, however, show exactly what is driving this 
result and give a markedly different picture of the effects of trade on war. The fixed effects 
estimator indicates no effect of trade on war for the full sample as well as for the 1939–97 
sample; for the 1870–1938 period, the coefficient is positive, but not significant. It is also worth 
noting that the years of peace variable is positive with the fixed effect estimator, implying that 
the longer the period of time since a particular country pair have engaged in war, the higher the 
likelihood of a future war between them.  
These  results  cast  doubt  about  the  extent  to  which  trade  interdependence  affects 
variations  in  the  likelihood  of  conflict  for  any  given  individual  country  pair.  That  is,  the 
explanatory power of trade in our war equations is entirely attributable to fitting variations across 
country pairs (between effects) rather than explaining variations across time for individual pairs 
(within effect).  
In order to illustrate this point more clearly, in Table 7 we estimate the “between effects” 
estimator for our war equation in two different ways. In the first three columns we report the 
                                                 
26 Another explanatory variable commonly employed in the literature is the degree of democratic similarity among 
country  pairs.  In  particular,  the  “democratic  peace”  proposition  hypothesizes  that  countries  sharing  similar 
democratic values are less likely to engage in war (Oneal and Russet, 1997, 1999).   15 
pooled logit estimates, similar to those in Table 6, but with the trade dependence ratio for each 
country pair replaced by the corresponding intra-pair mean (in these specifications we do not 
time-average the value of the any other explanatory variables in the specification) In the last 
three  columns  we  report  the  results  of  estimating  a  cross-section  relationship  in  which  the 
dependent variable and all explanatory variables are time averaged over the sample period. Since 
the average value of war is no longer a 0-1 variable in this case, we use a simple OLS estimator 
(with robust errors). In almost all cases we find that differences in trade levels across pairs exert 
a significant, negative effect on the likelihood of conflict (the sole exception is the cross-section 
estimate for the 1939–97 period). This implies that country pairs with overall higher levels of 
trade are on average less likely to engage in conflict than those with lower trade levels.  
We conclude this discussion by reporting in Table 8 the results of a panel instrumental 
variable regression, where we instrument for contemporaneous war with those variables found 
earlier to be useful in explaining the likelihood of war—the number of years since peace, major 
power  status,  alliance  relationships,  and  distance  (in  addition  to  all  of  the  regressors  in  the 
“second-stage”  trade  equation).
27  For  comparison,  in  the  first  column  we  report  the 
corresponding fixed effect results when not instrumenting out war. Year dummies are included 
but are not reported in both estimations.
28 The coefficient on war is slightly higher (in absolute 
value) in the results from the instrumental procedure (2.02 versus 1.78), but all other coefficients 
are virtually unchanged. Thus controlling for simultaneity does not have much of an effect. A 
Hausman test confirms this; the hypothesis of a systematic difference between the two sets of 
results in Table 8 can be rejected at better than 1 percent. 
In sum, our estimates of war equations imply that the level of trade interdependence may 
help to answer the question of which countries engage in conflict, rather than when countries 
engage in conflict. Trade does not appear to explain much of the time series variation in war for 
individual country pairs. Thus simultaneity does not appear to be a serious problem for our 
estimates of the effects of war and conflict on trade, particularly when controlling for fixed 
effects.  
                                                 
27 We instrument out only contemporaneous war, not its lags. Note that the first stage of this procedure involves 
estimation of a linear probability, rather than a probit, equation for war.  
28 These results are virtually identical to those previously reported in the first column of Table 2. They differ only in 
that the observation set is restricted to be the same as that used in the instrumental variable regression, as determined 
by the availability of data on our instruments.   16 
4. Counterfactuals for World Wars I and II 
Clearly war depresses world trade both between adversaries and with neutral countries. By how 
much did World Wars I and II reduce aggregate world trade? In this section we answer this 
question through use of our estimated gravity equations. 
   To construct a counterfactual “normal” benchmark level for trade in the absence of war, 
we assume that trade for each country pair would have stayed at the same level as that in the year 
before the outbreak of war (1913 for WWI, 1938 for WWII), which we denote here as year 0.
29 
That  is,  we  set 
normal
ijt ij0 Trade Trade =   for  all  t>0  in  the  interval  encompassing  the 
contemporaneous  years  of  war  and  the  10-year  aftermath  period  over  which  our  empirical 
analysis has suggested lagged effects of war may exist. With these imputed “normal” trade levels 
in the absence of war, we then employ our gravity model war coefficients—from column 1 in 
Table 5—to calculate the war-induced year-by-year reduction in trade among adversaries as well 
as belligerent-neutral country pairs from year to year. We can then aggregate all country pairs 
and compute the ratio of aggregate world trade in the presence of war to the counterfactual level 
in the absence of war.
30  
Specifically, we calculate the fractional wartime reduction in trade for each pair as
31: 
 















The impact of war on world trade in each year can then be computed as a weighted sum: 
 
                                                 
29 We have tried other approaches to check the sensitivity of this assumption. For example, we also tried a definition 
of normal that is based on the trend level of trade between the first year before the war and the 10
th year after the 
cessation of war (i.e., 1928 for WWI, 1955 for WWII). From these endpoints, we can linearly interpolate “normal” 
bilateral trade levels for the years 1914–1927 and 1939–1954 for all country pairs, and use that as the counterfactual 
reference level of trade in the absence of war. This made negligible difference to the subsequent calculations, so we 
elected to use the constant level of trade as a simple benchmark for illustration. 
30 Note that the gravity model estimates of the effect of war on trade require that we have data for actual trade and 
the regressor variables for at least some country pairs while at war. However, our counterfactual approach allows us 
to include the trade effects of war even for pairs for whom some or all such data are missing during these war 
episodes. All it requires is that actual trade data exist at the beginning of the war episodes, i.e., 1913 and 1938. 
Moreover, by assuming that the estimated war coefficients can be applied even to pair observations not in the 
underlying estimation because of missing data, we can infer the effect of war on the trade of these pairs as well. 
31 For multi-year wars the contemporaneous effects of war for belligerents and neutrals --  0 0 ￿ , ￿ -- apply for years 
t=1, …t*, where t* is the last year of the war; the lagged effects kick in for the aftermath years t*+1, … t*+10.   17 
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Although the decomposition is only approximate, we may use this formula to isolate two 
separate impacts, first, the reduction in world trade due to lost trade among the belligerents: 
 


























And, second, the reduction in world trade due to the impact of war on belligerent-neutral trade: 
 



























Figures 2 and 3 present the results of this exercise for WWI and WWII, respectively, with 
the impact on total world trade shown. Panel (a) shows the destructive impact on world trade of 
war between adversaries. Panel (b) shows the impact of war on world trade resulting from the 
destruction of trade between belligerents and neutrals. A ratio less than unity implies that trade in 
the presence of war is less than the (imputed) trade in the absence of war.
32 Dotted lines indicate 
95% confidence bands. The effects are, of course, smaller than those shown in Figure 1 since not 
every pair consisted of two adversaries (or a belligerent and a neutral). 
We observe that: 
                                                 
32 Note that the ratio of trade in the presence of war to counterfactual trade in the absence of war is unity by 
construction in the years before and after the intervals 1914–1927 and 1939–1954.    18 
o  In the case WWI, war among adversaries reduced world trade by roughly 12% in 1914-
1915 and by almost 15% in 1916–1918; the effects then dampened monotonically. The 
impact on neutrals reduced world trade by an additional 5–6% in the period 1914–18.  
o  In the case of WWII, war among adversaries reduced world trade by 15% in 1941 and by 
almost 20% in 1945, as more countries entered the war. The impact on neutrals accounts 
for a fall off in trade of an additional 8–9% during 1939–41; this effect then decays as the 
United States and other countries shift from neutral to belligerent status. 
On the face of it these effects are potentially very large in terms of implied costs for the world as 
a whole, and even more so for the countries concerned.
33 Cumulating a 15% loss of trade over a 
5-year  to  7-year  wartime  period,  followed  by  a  gradual  recovery  over  the  next  10  years, 
represents a significant and persistent economic burden. But this is somewhat conjectural: lost 
trade isn’t lost output. So we now attempt to measure the latter. 
  
5. Tallying the Costs of War 
Although we find evidence suggestive of large economic losses via lost trade, we cannot easily 
attach a welfare measure to these losses. Moreover, it may be thought that these losses would 
pale in comparison to the horrific losses of life that are included in the traditional direct costs of 
war. In the major conflicts, when millions perished, or even in the minor ones, we hesitate to 
place a pecuniary value on even one lost “statistical” life. Can millions of dollars of lost trade 
really be compared on a balance sheet with millions of dead and wounded? 
  Nonetheless, to make any comparison among the different costs of war, such a cold 
calculus is unfortunately necessary. That said, we proceed to draw on the ideas of Goldin and 
Lewis (1975) who made pioneering comparisons between the cost of waging the American Civil 
War and the cost of alternative counterfactual schemes for settling the North-South conflict (e.g., 
buying out the slaves). In the Goldin and Lewis approach to valuing lost human capital, the cost 
of a life lost in the war was valued at the prevailing average real wage, and the cost of a wounded 
individual at one half of this wage. Such losses could then be amortized at some discount rate to 
convert the annual lost wages every year (a flow) to a one-time cost (a stock). 
                                                 
33 Note that these calculations are based on coefficients estimated from the average effects of all wars in the sample, 
reported in column 1 of Table 5. The decline in trade would be even larger had we used the coefficients in the last 
two columns of Table 5, reflecting the estimated effects of World War I and II alone.    19 
The Costs of World War I 
Table 9 presents rough calculations of the costs of World War I on this basis, using the best 
estimates for dead and wounded, proxy real wage levels based on Maddison’s internationally 
comparable estimates of GDP per capita, and parameter assumptions for labor’s share of output 
(including human capital) and the share of the population in the workforce. Specifically, we 
assumed that the share of output earned by labor and human capital was two thirds (cf. Mankiw, 
Romer, and Weil 1992), and the labor force was one half of total population (the rough 1910 
average in the sample of Taylor and Williamson 1997). In this case, the percentage loss of output 
would  be  exactly  equal  to  4/3  (2/3  divided  by  1/2)  times  the  percentage  dead-equivalent 
population loss, if all dead are assumed to be of working age.
34 
As the table reports, at war’s end there were 8.6 million dead and 5.4 million wounded, 
for a total of 16.3 million dead-equivalent lost. The losses were unevenly spread. For the Central 
Powers, Germany and Austria-Hungary accounted for almost half of these losses, 7 million dead 
equivalent. Among the Allies, France bore a heavy cost with 2.5 million, with Britain losing 1.5 
million and Italy 1 million. However, judged with an eye to the scales of different countries, 
whether population or GDP, the relative costs looked rather different. Tiny New Zealand lost 37 
thousand (of 1.1 million) by the dead-equivalent measure; populous India lost 83 thousand (of 
304 million). 
  Applying  the  Goldin-Lewis  metric,  we  find  that  the  costs,  measured  as  permanent 
equivalent flow losses to GDP, were highest on the losing side. Germany (8.5%) and Austria-
Hungary (7.5%). Alternate, disputed death counts would also assign Turkey a large cost (see the 
notes to the Table).  France (8.0%) bore a heavy  burden, while the other Allies’ costs were 
somewhat lower: Britain (4.4%) and Italy (3.8%). On a proportional basis, three U.K. dominions 
also paid heavily: New Zealand (4.4%), Australia (3.7%) and Canada (2.3%). Bulgaria (4.9%), 
Serbia (4.9%), and Rumania (5.6%) witnessed large human costs on a GDP basis as well. In 
contrast, India’s massive economy barely registered a change, and the United States was also 
little affected. Summing over all these belligerents, we find a total flow cost to world GDP of 
3.4%. It is important to note that this cost was a burden primarily for the belligerent countries; 
since they comprised approximately 73% of world GDP, the direct human costs as a fraction of 
                                                 
34 To a first approximation, the percentage loss of output would equal the “labor plus human capital” share (2/3) 
times the percentage loss of workforce, which would in turn be twice the percentage loss of population.   20 
total world GDP amounted to around 2.5% of world GDP.
35 Absent demographic data for the 
war dead, we treat these flow costs as permanent as a first approximation, since most of the 
combatants were young soldiers with their whole adult working life stretched out before them, 
and the discounted value of their flow incomes 30 years or more into the future are of second 
order importance for this type of calculation. 
Now let us try to compare these direct human costs of WWI with the indirect costs 
arising  from  trade  destruction  using  the  estimates  from  our  model.  From  the  discussion  in 
Section  4,  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  trade-related  costs  of  war  are  substantial.  As 
discussed earlier, Figures 2a and 2b show the predicted size of “lost trade” during and after the 
war relative to a counterfactual “no war” scenario where trade levels are assumed to persist at 
their  1913  benchmark  levels.  Figure  2a,  which  shows  the  decline  for  just  the  belligerent-
belligerent country pairs, implies that the existence of a state of war between these countries 
caused total world trade to fall by approximately 12-15% during each of the 5 wartime years 
relative to the benchmark. In Figure 2b, for belligerent-neutral country pairs, the effect of one 
country in each pair being at war was to reduce total world trade by a further 5-6%. In each case, 
the model suggests that trade then recovered gradually over the next 10 years, before returning to 
its “normal” peacetime level. 
Using the calculations underlying these figures for each country pair and year we can 
compute the trade decline for any country or set of countries as a result of war and its lagged 
effects.  Still,  lost  trade  is  not  lost  income  (nor  lost  welfare).  So  these  loss  figures  are  not 
comparable  to  the  direct  war  cost  measures.  Can  we  convert  lost  trade  into  a  lost  output 
equivalent? 
One way to impute the implied loss of income is by using the Frankel and Romer (1999) 
estimates of the partial derivative of income (or growth) with respect to trade. In our notation, 
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35 Maddison’s estimate of World GDP for his sample of 56 countries in 1913 is $2,554,075 (in 1990 US$).   21 
where X is a vector of other control variables and 
^
Trade/Y is the exogenous component of the 
country’s trade share, which is constructed from an underlying first-stage gravity model using 
distance and other geographic variables as exogenous explanatory regressors.
36 This two-stage or 
instrumental variable (IV) approach allows the authors to control for the endogeneity of trade in 
these regressions, for without this step the OLS estimates of the coefficients are biased. The 
coefficient of interest to us is d, the slope of the output-trade relationship. Frankel and Romer 
(1999, Table 3, column 2) give an IV estimate of d = 1.97 for the trade share.
37 
The Frankel-Romer (FR) specification is ideally suited for our purposes since, at least 
with respect to the model used here, we may reasonably treat war as exogenous. Though the 
distance between a pair of countries never changes, the state of belligerency may fluctuate. Thus, 
d is the correct parameter to use in our study to capture the impact of exogenous declines in 
openness, or trade share, such as would be caused by wars. We should note that this formulation 
of the counterfactual impact deliberately holds fixed output levels in every country, thus avoiding 
the  question  as  to  whether  war  creates  a  boost  or  a  drag  on  the  domestic  economy  of  the 
belligerent, an effect that would also show up in the gravity equation but which we do not seek to 
estimate. Our focus on the trade channel allows us to finesse the issue, which is just as well given 
the scarce data on real output during wars.
38 
We proceed to assess the permanent income loss due to war and its aftermath relative to 
an assumed counterfactual constant baseline level of trade  corresponding to the actual trade 
observed in period t=0 prior to the start of war, here 1913. We can estimate the fractional loss of 
income in country i at time t>0 using a linear approximation implied by the Frankel-Romer 
estimated equation: 
 
                                                 
36 In our notation Trade is defined as the average of exports and imports. For Frankel and Romer, it is the sum. For 
this reason, using our definition, a factor of 2 must be added to the trade share coefficient. 
37  One  possible  concern  is  whether  we  may  safely  apply  the  FR  postwar  estimates  to  our  WWI  and  WWII 
counterfactuals. In a study of the entire twentieth century, Irwin and Terviö (2002) also find statistically significant 
2SLS (IV) estimates of the coefficient that exceed the OLS estimate, on multiple cross sections, including for 1913, 
the start date of our counterfactual. Unfortunately, due to the units used in their study, their coefficients are not 
comparable in the different cross sections they studied. 
38  This  is  not  to  say  such  effects  are  negligible.  The  magnitude  of  endogenous  GDP  shocks  is  the  subject  of 
considerable controversy in a parallel literature; recent research suggests they might also be quite large (Hess 2003).   22 
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Here, as we defined it above, 
war
ijt Trade  is the estimated trade for the pair at time t under wartime 
conditions, while  ij0 Trade  is the assumed “normal” peacetime trade level in all years (1913 for 
World War I). As we have discussed, the simulation also keeps GDP levels at their peacetime 
constant level (Yij0) to isolate the trade-destruction channel. Hence, drawing on our previous 
calculations, the implied GDP loss in country i at time t is: 
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Denoting the set of all countries in the world as C, we next sum these GDP losses over pairs 
(i,j) for various (possibly time-varying) subsets of country pairs  t V C C Í ´  and calculate their 
present value cost  
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by cumulating the discounted flow costs over the interval including the contemporaneous and 
lagged years of war, where ￿ is the discount factor.  
To  implement  the  cost  calculation  for  various  definitions  of  Vt,  let  Bt  be  the  set  of 
belligerents in the war in year t, and let Nt be the set of neutrals, that is, all remaining countries. 
Accordingly, we calculate  
o  losses to belligerents on trade with belligerents by setting  t t t V =B ×B ; 
o  losses to belligerents on trade with neutrals by setting  t t V =B ×Nt; 
o  losses to neutrals on trade with belligerents by setting  t t t V =N ×B . 
o  losses on all trade by setting  t V =C×C.   23 
We note that: countries may be belligerent at different times in any given war; by construction, 
neutral-neutral pairs experience no trade related losses; and only opposing belligerents suffer 
trade loss, whereas allies do not, due to the definition of the War dummy 
Table 10 reports the results of this exercise, using a discount factor of ￿ = 0.95. Looking 
at the weighting data, we see that in WWI the belligerent nations accounted for about half of 
world population, three-quarters of world GDP, and 80% of world trade (counting trade both 
between belligerents and between belligerent and neutral countries). According to our estimation 
method, both belligerents and neutrals suffered large economic impacts. Lost trade was greatest 
for trade among belligerents, as expected, leading to a permanent flow loss of 2.28% of GDP. 
The decline in trade involving neutrals caused a further income loss of 0.46%, for a total flow 
loss of 2.74% of GDP. Neutrals only suffered due to the collapse of trade with belligerents, but 
this was a large share of their own trade, explaining the large flow cost for them of 2.09% of 
GDP. On first sight it may seem odd that the small estimated impacts on neutrals seen in Figure 
1 can generate such relatively large losses for neutrals (2.09%) compared to belligerents (2.74%), 
but this follows from two facts. First, not every pair of belligerents was an adversarial pair. 
Second, many belligerents were big countries whilst most neutrals were small countries, and (in 
peacetime)  had  a  large  fraction  of  their  trade  with  belligerents,  as  the  gravity  model  would 
predict. The same absolute (real) bilateral trade loss shared by any two trading partners must 
weigh more heavily on the smaller country in the pair, since it will dent that country’s trade to 
GDP ratio much more, and hence have a bigger proportional impact on output via the Frankel-
Romer specification.
39 
One  possible  concern  is  whether  the  results  are  affected  by  using  the  FR  model  to 
estimate the effect of trade on output growth, rather than output levels. We answer this question 
by using Frankel and Romer’s IV estimate of the coefficient on the trade share with the growth 
rate of per capita income as the dependent variable: d = 1.31 (Frankel and Romer 1999, Table 4, 
column 10). In fact, the results turn out to be very similar either way, as shown in Figure 4. 
There we assume, for simplicity, a peacetime growth rate of 2% per annum, a discount rate of 
5%, a trade share of 10% of GDP divided equally among allies, adversaries, and neutrals, and an 
initial income level of 1 in period 1 (shown as 100%). Using the example of a five-year war 
(comparable to a major war like WWI) we find that the FR model in levels delivers a transitory 
                                                 
39 We assume no change in trade levels among allies and among neutrals.   24 
loss to output that is fully reversed after 10 years of peace. The model in growth rates delivers a 
much smaller loss, but one that is permanent. It so happens that both trajectories deliver a loss of 
output of about 2.5% in present discounted value. Thus, by coincidence, the exact form of the FR 
model does not appear to matter for our welfare cost estimates.  
Compared to the human costs, also shown in Table 10, the economic costs of lost trade 
were large. As a group, belligerents imposed a human cost on each other equal to 1.90% of lost 
population, or 3.41% of lost GDP (the GDP impact is larger due to composition effects: among 
belligerents, it was the richer countries that had higher casualties in WWI). Moreover, there were 
no global negative externalities in that human costs were essentially zero for neutrals. The total 
cost to the world as a whole, arising from the belligerents’ casualties, was a flow cost of 2.43% 
of  GDP—just  smaller  than  the  2.55%  attributed  to  lost  trade.  Under  these  assumptions  and 
metrics, the striking conclusion is that the costs of lost trade due to WWI were just about as large 
as the awful costs of lost human capital. 
The Costs of World War II 
We should not expect the same conclusion for World War II, which was a very different beast. 
World War I and previous wars were confined essentially to battle zones, with little attention 
given to civilians as targets. World War II was the first high-technology “total war” on a global 
scale, involving much larger losses of life, greater suffering among civilians, and much more 
widespread and devastating losses of economic assets (particularly physical capital). Compared 
to the first war, the second was a third longer in duration, encompassed about twice as many 
belligerent countries, touched 4 continents instead of 1, and mobilized 110 versus 70 million into 
the armed services (Nesterov 1990). We should therefore expect all of its attendant direct costs to 
have been that much higher. 
On the other hand, there is reason to question the magnitude of the indirect costs through 
damage to world trade. After all, there was much less trade at the beginning of World War II. 
Following World War I and the Great Depression, economic isolationism was rampant. By the 
late  1930s  tariffs  and  quotas  had  become  widespread.  In  addition,  transport  costs  had  risen 
significantly in the 1920s and 1930s, and the disintegration of the gold standard had also had a 
significant impact on trade volumes. Compared to the low barriers and low costs of trade in 
1913, the world of 1938 was much closer to autarky. Relative to world GDP, trade volumes were   25 
about one half what they had been in 1913, and close to their 1870 levels (Estevadeordal, Frantz, 
and Taylor 2003). 
  These concerns notwithstanding, we press ahead and repeat the exercises of Figure 2, 
Table 9, and Table 10 for World War II. The results are shown in Figure 3 and in Tables 11 and 
12. As noted earlier, Figure 3 is qualitatively very similar to Figure 2, although the trade losses 
mount up a little more slowly in 1939–41 for adversaries, as the belligerency slowly spreads to 
include the European Lowland countries and Italy in 1940 and the United States and Japan at the 
very end of 1941. The trough is a little deeper in World War II, however, with almost 20% of 
world trade destroyed by the adversaries. 
Table 11 now includes estimates of civilian casualties in the baseline figures, since World 
War II involved so many killed and injured noncombatants. We should interpret these figures 
cautiously, as the labor content of the civilian casualties was probably less than that of military 
casualties, implying our methodology will exaggerate somewhat the value of civilian losses. 
Given the margins of error on the casualty data, however, this need not cause undue anxiety. The 
total dead equivalent amounted to 79.5 million by our measure, where some missing data were 
imputed using the plausible assumption of a stable wounded/dead ratio (Appendix Table A1 
supplies the details). Without imputation, the figure falls to 46.2 million (penultimate row, Table 
10), and military casualties amount to about half the total, 34.7 million (final row). 
Losses for individual countries, on a population or GDP basis, are not surprising. The 
U.S.S.R with 31.5 million dead equivalent tops the list with a 24.8% GDP flow loss, closely 
followed  by  Yugoslavia  (22.6%)  and  Poland  (23.5%).  Germany  also  suffered  large  losses 
(16.7%), as did Hungary (10.5%). Japan lost about 8% and its adversary China 5% (but populous 
China suffered an absolute loss of 19.7 million dead, compared to Japan’s 4.4 million). Occupied 
France lost 3.3%, Belgium 2.4%, and Netherlands 5.5%, but Denmark only 0.2% and Norway 
0.8%. Britain’s loss was 1.7%, less than New Zealand on a proportional basis. The United States 
lost 0.7% by this measure. The loss for all belligerents, as a group, was 6.6% of GDP using the 
full (imputed) dataset, 4.9% without imputed data, and 3.6% for military casualties only. The 
latter figure may be compared with the 3.4% figure for World War I from Table 9, suggesting 
that it was the spread of total war off the battlefield and into civilian life that seriously escalated 
the level of damage to human capital in the second war.   26 
  Table 12 compares human costs to trade costs for World War II, treating 1938 as the 
baseline  level  of  trade.  Computing  the  human  loss  relative  to  total  world  GDP,  not  just 
belligerents’ GDP, leaves a bottom line figure of 5.43% for the global human capital loss on a 
permanent flow basis. If we think the civilian component is overstated (due to its smaller labor 
share), the true figure might be between 4% and 5%. The trade costs appear at the foot of the 
table and are much smaller, as expected. Adversaries cost each other 1.27% of GDP and also 
paid a further 0.36% due to trade lost with neutrals, for a total loss to the belligerents of 1.64%. 
The neutrals themselves suffered a loss in trade that we value at 1.10% of their own GDP on a 
flow basis. Globally, summing these figures, we arrive at an overall figure of 1.54% of GDP for 
the permanent flow costs of World War II. 
  These results, as compared with those for World War I, make sense. On a human level, 
World War II was about twice as costly (5.43% in Table 11 versus 2.43% in Table 9) simply 
because it was bigger, longer, and deadlier. With respect to the costs of trade destruction, World 
War II was only just over half as costly (1.54% in Table 11 versus 2.55% in Table 9) since, 
although more nations were caught up in the war, overall world trade (relative to GDP) had 
shrunk to about half its 1913 level by 1938. 
What About Other Costs of War? 
Of course, the value of lost human life is not the only cost of war. Total costs, though difficult to 
calculate, must also take account of the destruction of physical capital, excess military spending, 
looting, and many other types of loss. Yet even for wars that have been as meticulously studied 
as  World  Wars  I  and  II,  such  estimates  are  still  very  rough  and  subject  to  considerable 
disagreement  in  the  literature.  Nonetheless,  we  now  compare  our  trade  related  costs  to  the 
available figures, subject to this caveat, and we will argue that the trade-related costs still look 
quite large, and clearly so for World War I. 
  One of the most comprehensive studies of the total costs of World War I remains that of 
Bogart (1920), although it has been subject to recent criticism from Broadberry and Harrison 
(2005). The latter object to Bogart’s calculation of human costs and prefer to use a “replacement 
cost” approach to figuring human capital losses. However, this tends to produce a small figure 
for human costs (much smaller than ours above) since the latter authors do not capture lost utility 
but only child rearing costs; the true cost is probably also underestimated since the gestation   27 
period for human capital (about 18 years) is much longer than that needed to build or purchase 
and install a piece of physical capital, and an appropriate discount factor should be added. Since 
we have already computed our own human costs above, using a broader utility type measure, we 
avoid these problems. We capture the lost “consumer surplus” that would have been achieved by 
the casualties. We also avoid the potential objection that we have biased the result in our favor 
(of finding a relatively high trade-related cost) by using a human capital measure that looks “too 
small.” Instead we focus on Bogart’s other measures of war costs. Granted, these too attract 
some  objections  from  Broadberry  and  Harrison  (2005),  mainly  due  to  the  failure  to  correct 
expenditures for wartime inflation, since Bogart computes nominal rather than real totals. But 
again, for our purposes, this provides the right bias—if Bogart’s costs are too high and yet our 
trade costs still look significant in comparison, then they would look even bigger compared to 
inflation-adjusted costs. 
According to Bogart, what he calls the “direct” costs of World War I (excess government 
spending) were $186 billion in 1913 prices (Broadberry and Harrison 2005, Table 8). Excluding 
lost human capital, he found the “indirect” costs (property losses, etc.) were $84 billion. These 
are cumulative flows, or stock measures. For comparison we found the trade-related costs of 
World War I were 2.55% of world GDP on a flow basis, which equates to a stock value of $104 
billion in 1913 prices. Human costs were similarly $99 billion.
40 Adding these four figures we 
obtain a grand total of $473 billion, of which trade-related costs made up 22%. Thus, including 
the impact of lost trade would augment standard measures of the total costs of World War I by 
almost 30%—a significant correction, we think. 
It would be desirable to be able to replicate these calculations with at least the same 
(albeit limited) degree of confidence for World War II, but for the second war the extant figures 
appear even more fragile and subject to wider suspicion. Broadberry and Harrison (2005, table 
13) report an attempt by Nesterov (1990) to apply an approach similar to Bogart. He estimated 
direct losses at $1,433 billion in 1938 prices, and indirect losses (including not only property but 
also lost human capital, not tabulated separately) at $2,567 billion, for a total of $4,000 billion (a 
surprisingly round number). In these same units, we would calculate the stock value of trade-
                                                 
40 The world GDP figure of $2,726 billion in 1990 was deflated to 1913 dollars using the US CPI of 10/133.8, and 
the resulting flow costs for trade and human losses were multiplied by 20 to convert the flow to a stock assuming a 
5% discount rate.   28 
related costs of World War II at just $134 billion.
41 Clearly, we again see the relatively minor 
importance of trade-related costs in the massive conflagration of 1939–45. 
6. Conclusion 
Our work estimates the economic costs of war arising from the destruction of trade. Econometric 
analysis suggests that these costs are quantitatively large, statistically significant, and highly 
persistent. Case studies of the two world wars also demonstrate that these costs can be large (or 
at least of the same order of magnitude) when compared to more traditional measures of war’s 
costs, such as loss of life. 
War is hell: belligerents were aghast at the human toll they suffered as a result of their 
war;  but,  on  narrow  economic  grounds,  the  losses  due  to  trade  were  also  of  a  significant 
magnitude  and  are  not  as  widely  appreciated.  Wars  kill  trade  too.  Moreover,  the  negative 
externalities were huge. The belligerents wrecked the world economy not just for themselves but 
also for everyone else. 
  Our study also confronts the ongoing debate over whether the costs of war imposed on 
the belligerents themselves are enough to dissuade them from going to war in the first place. The 
liberal notion that gains from trade can support cooperation and peace is an old idea dating back 
at least to the fourth century, when the writer Libanius declared: 
God did not bestow all products upon all parts of the earth, but distributed His 
gifts  over  different  regions,  to  the  end  that  men  might  cultivate  a  social 
relationship because one would have need of the help of another. And so He 
called  commerce  into  being,  that  all  men  might  be  able  to  have  common 
enjoyment of the fruits of the earth, no matter where produced.
 42 
                                                 
41 Based on 1.54% of world GDP in 1938, using a U.S. CPI correction of 14/133.8 and again multiplying by 20 to 
convert the flow to a stock assuming a 5% discount rate. 
42 Libanius, Orations (III). The hypothesis was more formally developed by philosophers such as Montesquieu and 
Kant, and it formed the intellectual basis of a politically liberal world view that developed in the 19
th century, most 
famously propounded by the statesman Richard Cobden, who declared: “I see in the Free-Trade principle that which 
shall act on the moral world as the principle of gravitation in the universe, drawing men together, thrusting aside the 
antagonism  of  race,  and  creed,  and  language,  and  uniting  us  in  the  bonds  of  eternal  peace.”  Richard  Cobden, 
Speeches on Public Policy, By Richard Cobden, M.P., edited by John Bright and J. E. Thorold Rogers (London: 
Macmillan & Co., 1870).   29 
The view is pithily summarized in the epigraph from Bruce Chatwin and still finds resonance in 
contemporary debates, as in the works of Thomas Friedman.
43 
A modern literature in political science studies wars as a function of bilateral trade, but 
such models generally do very poorly at capturing when particular countries engage in war, 
although they do pick up some “between” correlation reflecting which countries “on average” 
engage  in  war.  Hence,  we  find  that  time-series  endogeneity  is  weak  once  fixed  effects  are 
included. Trade flows do not help us understand when pairs of countries go to war, and allowing 
for such reverse causality does nothing to change the large measured impact of war on trade 
volumes. Thus, we think it is more fruitful to focus on the causality from war to trade, and to see 
how large these trade-related costs of war actually are, so as to see if they might in fact plausibly 
offer the supposed disincentive to would be belligerents. 
Given the large trade costs of war that we find, it might seem reasonable to hope that they 
would dissuade rational policymakers from armed conflict. But the world wars offer a disturbing 
counterpoint  to  this  vision  and  their  legacy  suggests  a  different  perspective.  Perhaps  other 
mechanisms are needed to avert war, such as multinational institutions. An economic element for 
such a rationale might be gleaned from this paper, given the emphasis we place on the important 
and neglected role of external effects. The large negative trade externalities imposed on neutrals 
by  wars  ought  to  have  encouraged  neutral  countries  to  try  to  set  limits  to  the  belligerent 
tendencies of others. After the great wars, multilateral institutions (the League of Nations, the 
United Nations) held out such a promise, even if they were not entirely successful. Perhaps only 
thus could one hope to save the neutrals from the large negative spillovers generated by the 
belligerents—as well as to save the belligerents from themselves. 
                                                 
43 Thomas Friedman, The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century (Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 
2005).  Here  Friedman  refined  his  previous  “Golden  Arches”  theory—countries  with  McDonald’s  do  not  fight 
wars—to obtain his “Dell theory”: “people embedded in major global supply chains don' t want to fight old-time 
wars any more.”   30 
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Table 1: Sample Characteristics 
  1870-1997  1870-1938  1939-1997 
Total       
Pair-year observations  251905  13802  238103 
# of country pairs  11535  739  11476 
# countries  172  50  171 
       
War, contemporaneous       
Pair-year observations  206  59  147 
# of country pairs  75  25  64 
# countries   48  19  44 
       
War,  contemporaneous  and 
lagged       
Pair-year observations  2143  410  1733 
# of country pairs  338  72  296 
# countries  104  29  96 
       
Note:  “Total”  refers  to  pair-year  observations  with  data  on  bilateral  trade  and  GDP.  “War, 
contemporaneous” refers to country pairs at war with contemporaneous data on bilateral trade and 
GDP. “War, contemporaneous and lagged” refers to country pair observations of war or lagged war 
(for up to 10 years) with data on trade and GDP.  
 
 
   34 
Table 2: Pooled Panel Gravity Estimates, 1870–1997 
  Country Pair Fixed Effects  Country Pair Fixed Effects 
War  -1.78  ***  -2.06  *** 
   (0.09)     (0.09)    
War1  -1.28  ***  -1.49  *** 
   (0.16)     (0.16)    
War2  -1.32  ***  -1.45  *** 
   (0.15)     (0.14)    
War3  -1.12  ***  -1.10  *** 
   (0.13)     (0.13)    
War4  -0.70  ***  -0.65  *** 
   (0.12)     (0.12)    
War5  -0.55  ***  -0.50  *** 
   (0.10)     (0.10)    
War6  -0.37  ***  -0.22  ** 
   (0.09)     (0.09)    
War7  -0.22  ***  -0.09    
   (0.08)     (0.08)    
War8  -0.24  ***  -0.15  * 
   (0.08)     (0.08)    
War9  -0.11    -0.05    
   (0.08)     (0.08)    
War10  -0.03    0.03    
   (0.07)     (0.07)    
Log Distance  —†     —†    
              
Log Product Real GDPs  0.36  ***  0.05  *** 
  (0.01)     (0.01)    
Log Product Real GDP/capita  0.64  ***  0.81  *** 
  (0.01)     (0.01)    
Common Language  —†     —†    
              
Common Land Border  —†     —†    
              
Number Landlocked  —†     —†    
              
Number Islands  —†     —†    
              
Log Product Land Areas  0.23  ***  0.24  *** 
  (0.03)     (0.03)    
Current Colony   0.62  ***  0.70  *** 
   (0.07)     (0.07)    
Ever Colony  0.07    0.13    
   (0.15)     (0.16)    
Currency Union  0.21  ***  0.28  *** 
   (0.03)     (0.02)    
R-squared  0.46  0.32 
Number of Observations  251902  251902 
Number of Country Pairs  11535  11535 
Year Dummies  Yes  No 
Pair Dummies  Yes  Yes 
Country Dummies  No  No 
Avg. Effect, War -War5  -1.12  -1.21 
† variable dropped due to collinearity with country pair fixed effects. 
Year dummies and constant not reported. 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 3: Pooled Panel Gravity Estimates, 1870–1997: Alternative estimators 
  Random Effects  Maximum-Likelihood  OLS, robust, cluster  OLS, robust  
War  -1.79  ***  -1.79  ***  -1.96  ***  -2.18  *** 
   (0.09)     (0.09)     (0.27)     (0.18)    
War1  -1.25  ***  -1.25  ***  -1.48  ***  -1.64  *** 
   (0.16)     (0.16)     (0.28)     (0.28)    
War2  -1.27  ***  -1.28  ***  -1.32  ***  -1.52  *** 
   (0.15)     (0.15)     (0.25)     (0.24)    
War3  -1.09  ***  -1.09  ***  -0.93  ***  -1.24  *** 
   (0.13)     (0.13)     (0.17)     (0.17)    
War4  -0.68  ***  -0.68  ***  -0.58  ***  -0.79  *** 
   (0.12)     (0.12)     (0.17)     (0.16)    
War5  -0.51  ***  -0.52  ***  -0.13    -0.44  *** 
   (0.10)     (0.10)     (0.13)     (0.12)    
War6  -0.34  ***  -0.34  ***  -0.13    -0.34  *** 
   (0.09)     (0.09)     (0.11)     (0.10)    
War7  -0.20  **  -0.21  **  -0.08    -0.24  *** 
   (0.08)     (0.08)     (0.09)     (0.09)    
War8  -0.22  ***  -0.22  ***  -0.04    -0.21  ** 
   (0.08)     (0.08)     (0.09)     (0.09)    
War9  -0.10    -0.10    0.03    -0.13  * 
   (0.08)     (0.08)     (0.09)     (0.08)    
War10  -0.02    -0.02    0.14  *  -0.04    
   (0.07)     (0.07)     (0.08)     (0.08)    
Log Distance  -1.38  ***  -1.38  ***  -1.02  ***  -1.17  *** 
   (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.02)     (0.01)    
Log Product Real GDPs  0.72  ***  0.71  ***  0.87  ***  —†   
  (0.01)     (0.01)     (0.01)         
Log Product Real GDP/capita  0.43  ***  0.43  ***  0.45  ***  0.11  *** 
  (0.01)     (0.01)     (0.02)     (0.01)    
Common Language  0.38  ***  0.38  ***  0.44  ***  0.45  *** 
   (0.05)     (0.05)     (0.04)     (0.01)    
Common Land Border  0.49  ***  0.50  ***  0.31  ***  0.16  *** 
   (0.15)     (0.15)     (0.11)     (0.02)    
Number Landlocked  -0.36  ***  -0.37  ***  -0.12  ***  2.18    
   (0.04)     (0.04)     (0.04)     (1141.42)    
Number Islands  0.07    0.07    0.02    1.10    
   (0.05)     (0.05)     (0.04)     (1051.35)    
Log Product Land Areas   0.02  ***  0.03  ***  -0.09  ***  -0.34  *** 
  0.01      (0.01)     (0.01)     (0.03)    
Current Colony   0.58  ***  0.58  ***  0.98  ***  0.95  *** 
   (0.07)     (0.07)     (0.25)     (0.05)    
Ever Colony  0.97  ***  0.92  ***  1.24  ***  1.23  *** 
   (0.12)     (0.12)     (0.13)     (0.02)    
Currency Union  0.16  ***  0.16  ***  1.00  ***  0.80  *** 
   (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.10)     (0.03)    
R-squared  0.62  N.A.  0.64  0.48 
Number of Observations  251902  251902  251902  251902 
Number of Country Pairs  11535  11535  11535  11535 
Pair Dummies  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Country Dummies  No  No  No  Yes 
Avg.Effect, War-War5  -1.10  -1.10  -1.07  -1.30 
† coefficient constrained to equal unity. 
Year dummies and constant not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% indicated by ***, **, 
and *, respectively. 
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Table 4: Trade Effects of War: Subperiods, 1870–1938 and 1939–1997 
  1870-1997  1870-1938  1939-1997  1870-1938  1939-1997 
                   
World War I 
only  
World War II  
only  
War  -1.78  ***  -2.09  ***  -1.83  ***  -3.02  ***  -2.74  *** 
   (0.09)     (0.10)     (0.11)     (0.12)     (0.17)    
War1  -1.28  ***  -1.39  ***  -1.32  ***  -2.14  ***  -1.14  *** 
   (0.16)     (0.19)     (0.18)     (0.24)     (0.29)    
War2  -1.32  ***  -0.88  ***  -1.55  ***  -1.32  ***  -1.88  *** 
   (0.15)     (0.16)     (0.17)     (0.19)     (0.26)    
War3  -1.12  ***  -0.46  ***  -1.28  ***  -0.66  ***  -1.32  *** 
   (0.13)     (0.17)     (0.15)     (0.19)     (0.19)    
War4  -0.70  ***  -0.34  **  -0.76  ***  -0.67  ***  -0.98  *** 
   (0.12)     (0.15)     (0.13)     (0.18)     (0.18)    
War5  -0.55  ***  -0.10    -0.63  ***  -0.20    -0.62  *** 
   (0.10)     (0.13)     (0.11)     (0.16)     (0.13)    
War6  -0.37  ***  -0.06    -0.42  ***  -0.15    -0.39  *** 
   (0.09)     (0.12)     (0.10)     (0.14)     (0.11)    
War7  -0.22  ***  0.02    -0.25  ***  -0.01    -0.23  ** 
   (0.08)     (0.12)     (0.09)     (0.13)     (0.10)    
War8  -0.24  ***  0.04    -0.28  ***  0.01    -0.27  *** 
   (0.08)     (0.11)     (0.09)     (0.13)     (0.10)    
War9  -0.11    0.13    -0.16  *  0.06    -0.21  ** 
   (0.08)     (0.11)     (0.09)     (0.12)     (0.10)    
War10  -0.03    0.11    -0.07     0.04    -0.08    
   (0.07)     (0.10)     (0.08)     (0.11)     (0.10)    
R-squared  0.46  0.31  0.17  0.31  0.15 
Number of Observations  251902  13799  238103  13799  238103 
Number of Country Pairs  11535  739  11476  739  11476 
Avg. Effect, War-War5  -1.12  -0.88  -1.23  -1.34  -1.45 
Country pair fixed effect estimates. Controls not reported: distance, GDP, GDP per capita, language, land border, landlocked, 
islands, land area, current colony, ever colony, currency union, year dummies, and constant. 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.   37 
Table 5: Trade Effects of War: Effect on Neutrals Included 
  1870-1997  1870-1938  1939-1997  1870-1938  1939-1997 
                   
World War I 
only  
World War II 
only  
War  -1.87  ***  -2.12  ***  -1.92  ***  -3.29  ***  -3.46  *** 
   (0.09)     (0.10)     (0.11)     (0.13)     (0.19)    
War1  -1.32  ***  -1.41  ***  -1.36  ***  -2.33  ***  -1.41  *** 
   (0.16)     (0.19)     (0.18)     (0.25)     (0.29)    
War2  -1.35  ***  -0.86  ***  -1.58  ***  -1.45  ***  -2.14  *** 
   (0.15)     (0.16)     (0.17)     (0.20)     (0.27)    
War3  -1.15  ***  -0.47  ***  -1.31  ***  -0.73  ***  -1.46  *** 
   (0.13)     (0.17)     (0.15)     (0.20)     (0.20)    
War4  -0.74  ***  -0.38  **  -0.80  ***  -0.79  ***  -1.08  *** 
   (0.12)     (0.15)     (0.13)     (0.19)     (0.19)    
War5  -0.57  ***  -0.11    -0.65  ***  -0.27  *  -0.75  *** 
   (0.10)     (0.13)     (0.11)     (0.16)     (0.13)    
War6  -0.39  ***  -0.09    -0.44  ***  -0.23    -0.51  *** 
   (0.09)     (0.12)     (0.10)     (0.14)     (0.11)    
War7  -0.24  ***  0.00    -0.26  ***  -0.07    -0.35  *** 
   (0.08)     (0.12)     (0.09)     (0.14)     (0.10)    
War8  -0.24  ***  0.02    -0.28  ***  -0.03    -0.35  *** 
   (0.08)     (0.11)     (0.09)     (0.14)     (0.10)    
War9  -0.11    0.10    -0.15  *  0.00    -0.26  ** 
   (0.08)     (0.11)     (0.09)     (0.12)     (0.10)    
War10  -0.03    0.12    -0.07     0.05    -0.12    
   (0.07)     (0.10)     (0.08)     (0.12)     (0.10)    
Neutral  -0.13  ***  -0.04    -0.12  ***  -0.54  ***  -1.06  *** 
   (0.01)     (0.03)     (0.01)     (0.07)     (0.11)    
Neutral1  -0.07  ***  -0.02    -0.07  ***  -0.36  **  -0.58  ** 
   (0.02)     (0.04)     (0.02)     (0.14)     (0.26)    
Neutral2  -0.04  **  0.07  *  -0.04  **  -0.25  **  -0.57  ** 
   (0.02)     (0.04)     (0.02)     (0.10)    (0.23)    
Neutral3  -0.05  ***  0.00    -0.04  **  -0.15    -0.18  * 
   (0.02)     (0.04)     (0.02)     (0.10)    (0.10)    
Neutral4  -0.09  ***  -0.08  *  -0.08  ***  -0.23  **  -0.16   
   (0.02)     (0.04)     (0.02)     (0.10)    (0.10)    
Neutral5  -0.07  ***  -0.03    -0.07  ***  -0.13    -0.25  *** 
   (0.02)     (0.04)     (0.02)     (0.10)    (0.07)    
Neutral6  -0.09  ***  -0.08  *  -0.09  ***  -0.18  *  -0.27  *** 
   (0.02)     (0.04)     (0.02)     (0.09)    (0.07)    
Neutral7  -0.05  **  -0.08  *  -0.04  **  -0.12    -0.24  *** 
   (0.02)     (0.04)     (0.02)     (0.09)    (0.06)    
Neutral8  0.01    -0.09  **  0.01     -0.07    -0.14  ** 
   (0.02)     (0.04)     (0.02)     (0.09)    (0.06)    
Neutral9  0.02    -0.09  **  0.03     -0.12    -0.04   
   (0.02)     (0.04)     (0.02)     (0.08)    (0.06)    
Neutral10  0.02    -0.01    0.02     0.01    -0.08    
   (0.02)     (0.04)     (0.02)     (0.08)     (0.06)    
R-squared  0.46  0.31  0.16  0.31  0.13 
Number of Observations  251902  13799  238103  13799  238103 
Number of Country Pairs  11535  739  11476  739  11476 
Average Effect, War-War5  -1.17  -0.89  -1.27  -1.48  -1.72 
Average Effect, Neu-Neu5  -0.07  -0.02  -0.07  -0.28  -0.47 
Country pair fixed effect estimates. Controls not reported: distance, output, output per capita, language, land border, landlocked, 
islands, land area, current colony, ever colony, currency union, year dummies, and constant. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.   38 
Table 6: Estimates of Likelihood of War: Alternative estimators and subperiods 
  1870-1997  1870-1938  1939-1997  1870-1997  1870-1938  1939-1997 
 







ln(Tradeij/YiYj)t-2  -0.40  ***  -0.57  ***  -0.39  ***  0.05    1.51    0.02   
   (0.02)     (0.08)     (0.02)    (0.09)     (1.57)    (0.14)   
YrsPeacet-2  -0.01  ***  -0.01    -0.01  ***  0.11  ***  0.20  ***  0.47  *** 
   (0.00)     (0.01)     (0.00)    (0.01)     (0.06)     (0.05)    
MajPower  -1.06  ***  -0.15    -1.34  ***  —†    —†    —†   
   (0.17)     (0.35)     (0.19)                  
Alliancet-2  -0.71  **  0.18    -0.92  ***  -0.69    -0.97    -1.78  ** 
   (0.29)     (0.73)     (0.32)    (0.43)     (5.66)    (0.71)   
Border  0.88  ***  0.80    1.03  ***  —†    —†    —†   
   (0.34)     (0.51)    (0.40)                
Pseudo R-squared  0.51  0.47  0.51       
Log Likelihood  -4335.49  -491.48  -3813.67  -309.19  -10.49  -153.03 
Number of Observations  187844  5273  182571  14522  1473  8469 
Number of Country Pairs  9942  661  9908  329  70  249 
† variable dropped in fixed effects regression. 
Year dummies and constant not reported. Estimates for YrsPeace divided by 100. 








Table 7: Estimates of Likelihood of War: Between effects 
  1870-1997  1870-1938  1939-1997  1870-1997  1870-1938  1939-1997 
  Logit  Logit  Logit  OLS Cross
†
  OLS Cross
†  OLS Cross
† 
Mean of ln(Tradeij/YiYj)t-2  -0.49  ***  -0.83  ***  -0.46  ***  -0.01  **  -0.10  ***  0.00   
   (0.03)     (0.12)     (0.03)    (0.00)     (0.03)    (0.00)   
YrsPeacet-2  -0.01  ***  -0.01    -0.01  ***  -0.01  ***  -0.05  ***  -0.01  *** 
   (0.00)     (0.01)     (0.00)    (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00)    
MajPower  -0.84  ***  -0.08    -1.13  ***  0.19  ***  0.16    0.41  *** 
   (0.17)     (0.38)     (0.18)    (0.06)     (0.15)     (0.07)    
Alliancet-2  -0.71  **  0.21    -0.99  ***  -0.36  ***  2.77  **  -0.22  *** 
   (0.30)     (0.78)     (0.33)    (0.06)     (1.29)    (0.06)   
Border  1.09  ***  1.28  **  1.19  ***  0.64  ***  0.79  **  0.42  *** 
   (0.35)     (0.60)    (0.41)    (0.15)     (0.37)    (0.16)   
Pseudo R-squared  0.52  0.51  0.51  0.13  0.50  0.15 
Log Likelihood  -4327.92  -455.37  -3865.37       
Number of Observations  187844  5273  182571  13715  776  13668 
Number of Country Pairs  9942  661  9908  13715  776  13668 
† all variables time averaged over sample period. 
Year dummies and constant not reported in logit regressions. Constant not reported for OLS cross section regression. Coefficient 
for YrsPeace are divided by 100.  
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.   39 
Table 8: Trade Effects of War, 1870-1997: Treating War as Endogenous 
  Actual War  Instrumented War 
War  -1.80  ***  -2.02  *** 
   (0.09)     (0.67)    
War1  -1.29  ***  -1.30  *** 
   (0.16)     (0.17)    
War2  -1.32  ***  -1.33  *** 
   (0.15)     (0.15)    
War3  -1.12  ***  -1.13  *** 
   (0.13)     (0.13)    
War4  -0.71  ***  -0.72  *** 
   (0.12)     (0.12)    
War5  -0.55  ***  -0.56  *** 
   (0.10)     (0.10)    
War6  -0.37  ***  -0.37  *** 
   (0.09)     (0.09)    
War7  -0.22  ***  -0.23   *** 
   (0.08)     (0.08)    
War8  -0.24  ***  -0.24  *** 
   (0.08)     (0.08)    
War9  -0.11    -0.12    
   (0.08)     (0.08)    
War10  -0.03    -0.03    
   (0.07)     (0.07)    
Log Distance  —†     —†    
             
Log Product Real GDPs  0.36  ***  0.36  *** 
  (0.01)     (0.01)    
Log Product Real GDP/capita  0.64  ***  0.64  *** 
  (0.01)     (0.01)    
Common Language  —†     —†    
              
Common Land Border  —†     —†    
              
Number Landlocked  —†     —†    
              
Number Islands  —†     —†    
              
Log Product Land Areas  0.24  ***  0.24  *** 
  (0.03)     (0.03)    
Current Colony   0.62  ***  0.62  *** 
   (0.07)     (0.07)    
Ever Colony  0.07    0.07    
   (0.15)     (0.15)    
Currency Union  0.20  ***  0.20  *** 
   (0.03)     (0.03)    
R-squared  0.45  0.39 
Number of Observations  251736  251736 
Number of Country Pairs  11535  11535 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes 
Pair Dummies  Yes  Yes 
Country Dummies  No  No 
Avg. Effect, War -War5  -1.13  -1.18 
First column reports pooled panel estimates with fixed effects; second column reports pooled panel estimates with fixed effects 
while instrument out War. Instrumental variables are YrsPeace, MajPower, and Alliance, as well as variables in the gravity 
regression. Year dummies and constant not reported  
† variable dropped due to collinearity with country pair fixed effects.  
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.   40 
Table 9: Human Costs of World War I 
(b) Costs                Maddison (1990$)       
      Dead    1913 Pop.  Cost  1913 GDP     
   Dead  Wounded  equivalent     (mil.)  ($mil.)  ($mil.)    Cost/GDP 
France  1,398,000  2,000,000  2,398,000   39.8  11,114  138,665   8.0% 
Belgium  13,000  44,686  35,343   7.7  198  32,347   0.6% 
Italy  578,000  947,000  1,051,500   36.6  3,629  94,845   3.8% 
Portugal  7,000  13,751  13,876   6.0  23  7,467   0.3% 
Britain  723,000  1,662,625  1,554,313   47.4  10,172  233,248   4.4% 
Canada  60,383  155,799  138,283   7.9  818  34,916   2.3% 
Australia  54,890  158,199  133,990   4.8  919  24,861   3.7% 
New Zealand  16,500  41,432  37,216   1.1  255  5,781   4.4% 
India  59,296  46,969  82,781   303.7  74  204,242   0.0% 
Rumania  250,000  120,000  310,000   7.4  718  12,807   5.6% 
Serbia  45,000  133,148  111,574   3.0  157  3,205   4.9% 
Greece  5,000  21,000  15,500   2.7  33  4,344   0.8% 
Russia  1,811,000  1,450,000  2,536,000   154.0  5,017  229,143   2.2% 
USA  114,000  205,690  216,845   97.6  1,529  517,383   0.3% 
Bulgaria  88,000  152,390  164,195   4.4  335  6,792   4.9% 
Germany  2,037,000  4,207,028  4,140,514   65.1  20,089  237,332   8.5% 
Austria-Hungary  1,100,000  3,620,000  2,910,000   51.4  10,571  140,268   7.5% 
Turkey  236,000  400,000  436,000   15.0  703  18,195   3.9% 
All belligerents  8,596,069  15,379,717  16,285,928    855.5  66,354  1,945,840    3.4% 
 
Sources: See text and notes. Dead and wounded: Military casualties only. Data from Ferguson (1999), except Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand and India from Bogart (1919), with authors’ adjustments (see below). Incomes and populations: Maddison (2004), 
adjusted to 1913 land borders, using Maddison (1995, 2001), except Austria-Hungary: for Hungary the Maddison GDP per capita 
is $2,098, for Austria it is $3,465; a population-weighted average for Austria and Hungary give $2,731. GDP is computed based 
on a total census population in 1910 of 51.356 million from Mitchell (1992). 
Notes: Dead equivalent are dead plus one half wounded. Cost (flow cost) is calculated as real wage times dead equivalent. Real 
wage is proxied by real GDP per capita times labor’s share (estimated as 2/3) divided by labor share of population (estimated as 
1/2). Austria-Hungary: for Hungary the Maddison GDP per capita is $2,098, for Austria it is $3,465; an average between Austria 
and Hungary gives $2,781.5. GDP is then computed based on a total population in 1910 of 51.356 million from Mitchell (1992). 
Variant estimates of the death counts were considered for several countries, as follows. We found that the above Bogart-Ferguson 
casualty data closely match most the death counts for almost all countries in other studies, e.g., Broadberry and Harrison (2005), 
and the consensus is usually close to the figures presented in the original U.S. War Department study of 1924. This is not 
surprising since Urlanis (1971) is an important original source for these studies. However, most sources show considerable 
disagreement with Urlanis in the case of four countries (see: e.g., http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat1.htm), where Urlanis 
has very high estimates of death. We cannot discount Urlanis, however, since he had special access to Soviet archives, which 
may  lend  his  counts  greater  precision  in  some  cases.  The  four countries,  with  corresponding  ranges  of  alternate  death  toll 
estimates, are Belgium (low “consensus”: 13,000; high, from Urlanis: 38,000), Serbia (low: 45,000–128,000; high: 278,000), 
Greece (low: 5,000; high: 26,000), and Turkey (low: 236,000–450,000; high: 804,000). As a sensitivity check, we recalculated 
costs for these 4 countries using the lowest of these ranges of estimates. Costs for these particular countries change markedly in 
this case, but the overall costs of the war do not change (since these are countries with small GDP weights). The table shows the 
results with the low estimates.   41 
Table 10: Economic Costs of World War I: Human versus Trade 
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Trade costs, total 
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Notes:  The  definition  of  belligerents  is  those  countries  ever  involved  in  WWI  during  years  1914  to  1918.  This  does  not 
correspond exactly with the gravity-model belligerent dummy at all times: some countries may be omitted, and not all were 
belligerents for the entire war (e.g., the United States). 
Sources:  Weighting  data  on  population  and  GDP  from  Maddison’s  (1995)  “world”  199-country  imputed  totals  and  the 
corresponding data for belligerents as listed in Table 9. Trade data are from the authors’ data; see text. 
(a) based on Table 9 and its underlying calculations; 
(b) zeroes assumed; 
(c) based on a weighted average of (a) and (b); 
(d) see text and Table 5, Column 1; GDP costs depend on trade share; 
(e) see text and Table 5, Column 1; GDP costs depend on trade share; 
(f) based on a weighted average of (d) and (e) using belligerent and neutral shares of world trade and GDP, respectively. 
(g) as (d); 
(h) zeroes assumed; 
(i) based on a weighted average of (g) and (h) using belligerent and neutral shares of world trade and GDP, respectively. 
(j) based on a sum of (d) and (g). 
(k) based on a sum of (e) and (h). 
(l) based on a sum of (f) and (i).   42 
 Table 11: Human Costs of World War II 
            Maddison (1990$)     
      Dead   1938 Pop.  Cost  1938 GDP    
   Dead  Wounded  equivalent    (mil.)  ($mil.)  ($mil.)   Cost/GDP 
Belgium  88,000  132,000  154,000   8.4  990  40,466   2.4% 
Brazil  943  4,222  3,054   39.5  5  50,376   0.0% 
Australia  23,365  72,196  59,463   6.9  466  40,639   1.1% 
Canada  37,476  64,062  69,507   11.5  420  52,060   0.8% 
India  24,338  155,597  102,137   454.2  91  303,593   0.0% 
New Zealand  10,033  29,896  24,981   1.6  215  10,365   2.1% 
South Africa  6,840  30,793  22,237   10.5  65  22,965   0.3% 
United Kingdom*  357,116  490,996  602,614   47.5  5,022  297,619   1.7% 
China  11,310,224 16,752,951 19,686,700   513.3  14,718  288,549   5.1% 
Czechoslovakia  225,000  337,500  393,750   15.4  1,491  43,951   3.4% 
Denmark  3,800  5,700  6,650   3.8  51  21,765   0.2% 
France  563,324  925,000  1,025,824   42.0  6,093  187,402   3.3% 
Greece  413,300  619,950  723,275   7.1  2,575  18,901   13.6% 
Netherlands  207,900  302,860  359,330   8.7  2,509  45,593   5.5% 
Norway  10,000  15,000  17,500   2.9  101  12,734   0.8% 
Poland*  5,798,178  657,366  6,126,861   34.7  17,783  75,656   23.5% 
Philippines  118,000  177,000  206,500   15.9  418  24,252   1.7% 
United States*  298,131  811,510  703,886   130.5  5,735  799,357   0.7% 
USSR  18,000,000 27,000,000 31,500,000   168.6  90,063  362,451   24.8% 
Yugoslavia  1,505,000  2,225,000  2,617,500   15.4  4,722  20,938   22.6% 
Bulgaria  20,000  30,000  35,000   6.2  74  9,962   0.7% 
Finland  84,000  53,000  110,500   3.7  528  13,123   4.0% 
Germany*  4,280,000  8,400,000  8,480,000   67.3  50,207  299,753   16.7% 
Hungary  490,000  470,000  725,000   9.2  2,560  24,342   10.5% 
Italy*  395,263  416,000  603,263   44.1  2,655  145,878   1.8% 
Japan*  1,972,000  4,810,000  4,377,000   71.9  14,258  176,051   8.1% 
Rumania  500,000  550,000  775,000   19.7  1,280  24,526   5.2% 
All belligerents  46,742,231 65,538,599 79,511,531    1760.0  225,642  3,413,267    6.6% 
All belligerents* (missing data=0)  36,742,231 18,958,697 46,221,580    1760.0  166,277  3,413,265    4.9% 
All belligerents (military losses only) 19,395,617 30,555,675 34,673,455    1760.0  121,640  3,413,265    3.6% 
 
Sources: See text and notes. Dead and wounded include both military and civilian casualties; some missing data are imputed 
except for rows marked *. See Appendix Table A1 for details and sources. Incomes and populations are from Maddison (2004), 
adjusted to 1938 borders using Maddison (1995, 2001); Czechoslovakia data are 1937 values and South Africa data are 
interpolated using 1913 and 1950 values. 
Notes: Dead equivalent are dead plus one half wounded. Cost (flow cost) is calculated as real wage times dead equivalent. Real 
wage is proxied by real GDP per capita times labor’s share (estimated as 2/3) divided by labor share of population (estimated as 
1/2).   43 
Table 12: Economic Costs of World War II: Human versus Trade 
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Trade costs, total 
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Notes:  The  definition  of  belligerents  is  those  countries  ever  involved  in  WWII  during  years  1939  to  1945.  This  does  not 
correspond exactly with the gravity-model belligerent dummy at all times: some countries may be omitted, and not all were 
belligerents for the entire war (e.g., the United States), and some switched sides (e.g., Italy). 
Sources:  Weighting  data  on  population  and  GDP  from  Maddison’s  (1995)  “world”  199-country  imputed  totals  and  the 
corresponding data for belligerents as listed in Table 11. Trade data are from the authors’ data; see text. 
(a) based on Table 11 and its underlying calculations; 
(b) zeroes assumed; 
(c) based on a weighted average of (a) and (b); 
(d) see text and Table 5, Column 1; GDP costs depends on trade share; 
(e) see text and Table 5 Column 1; GDP costs depends on trade share; 
(f) based on a weighted average of (d) and (e) using belligerent and neutral shares of world trade and GDP, respectively. 
(g) as (d); 
(h) zeroes assumed; 
(i) based on a weighted average of (g) and (h) using belligerent and neutral shares of world trade and GDP, respectively. 
(j) based on a sum of (d) and (g). 
(k) based on a sum of (e) and (h). 
(l) based on a sum of (f) and (i).   44 
Figure 1 
Impact of War on Trade for a Given Country Pair 
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Source: Table 5, column 1.   45 
Figure 2 
Impact of World War I on World Trade 
 
Predicted Aggregate Wartime Trade Relative to Counterfactual Peacetime Level (1913) 
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Notes and Sources: Authors’ calculations. See text.   46 
Figure 3 
Impact of World War II on World Trade 
 
Predicted Aggregate Wartime Trade Relative to Counterfactual Peacetime Level (1938) 
 
 
(a) Adversary Country Pairs 
Figure 2a. Relative Decline in Trade Among Adversaries, World War 2
year
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Notes and Sources: Authors’ calculations. See text.   47 
Figure 4 
Impact of War on Trade and Growth Trajectory Using the Frankel-Romer (FR) Method: 
Comparison of Predicted Present Discounted Value of Losses 
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Appendix Table A1: Estimating World War II Casualties 























Belgium  12,000 18,000 76,000 114,000 88,000 132,000 154,000 88,000
Brazil   943 4,222 0 0 943 4,222 3,054 3,054
Australia  23,365 39,803 21,595 32,393 23,365 72,196 59,463 59,463
Canada  37,476 53,174 7,259 10,888 37,476 64,062 69,507 69,507
India  24,338 64,354 60,829 91,243 24,338 155,597 102,137 102,137
New Zealand  10,033 19,314 7,055 10,582 10,033 29,896 24,981 24,981
South Africa  6,840 14,363 10,953 16,430 6,840 30,793 22,237 22,237
U.K.  264,443 277,077 92,673 213,919 357,116 490,996 602,614 602,614
China  1,310,224 1,752,951 10,000,000 15,000,000 11,310,224 16,752,951 19,686,700 2,244,324
Czechoslovakia  10,000 15,000 215,000 322,500 225,000 337,500 393,750 225,000
Denmark  1,800 2,700 2,000 3,000 3,800 5,700 6,650 3,800
France  213,324 400,000 350,000 525,000 563,324 925,000 1,025,824 763,324
Greece  88,300 132,450 325,000 487,500 413,300 619,950 723,275 413,300
Netherlands  7,900 2,860 200,000 300,000 207,900 302,860 359,330 209,330
Norway  3,000 4,500 7,000 10,500 10,000 15,000 17,500 10,000
Poland  123,178 236,606 5,675,000 420,760 5,798,178 657,366 6,126,861 6,126,861
Philippines  27,000 40,500 91,000 136,500 118,000 177,000 206,500 118,000
United States  292,131 671,801 6,000 139,709 298,131 811,510 703,886 703,886
U.S.S.R.  11,000,000 16,500,000 7,000,000 10,500,000 18,000,000 27,000,000 31,500,000 18,000,000
Yugoslavia  305,000 425,000 1,200,000 1,800,000 1,505,000 2,225,000 2,617,500 1,717,500
Bulgaria  10,000 15,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 30,000 35,000 20,000
Finland  82,000 50,000 2,000 3,000 84,000 53,000 110,500 109,000
Germany  3,500,000 5,000,000 780,000 3,400,000 4,280,000 8,400,000 8,480,000 8,480,000
Hungary  200,000 300,000 290,000 170,000 490,000 470,000 725,000 575,000
Italy  242,322 66,000 152,941 350,000 395,263 416,000 603,263 603,263
Japan  1,300,000 4,000,000 672,000 810,000 1,972,000 4,810,000 4,377,000 4,377,000
Romania  300,000 450,000 200,000 100,000 500,000 550,000 775,000 550,000
Totals  19,395,617 30,555,675 27,454,305 34,982,924 46,742,231 65,538,599 79,511,531 46,221,580
 
Sources: Casualty data were taken from http://www.worldwar2database.com/html/frame4.htm, with supplementary data taken 
from http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/ww2stats.htm. 
Notes on Imputed Data: As a preliminary step, missing data for dead or wounded (civilians and military) were imputed by four 
methods: 1. All missing data set to zero; 2. Assume that for each country the number of wounded equaled 1.5 times the number 
of dead; 3. Assume that the proportion of wounded to dead for countries with missing data was the same as for those with data. 
For method 3, the following regression was run: WOUNDED = a + b*DEAD. For military casualties we found: 17 observations, 
a = 56,207 (t=0.38) and b = 1.57 (t=10.33), R
2=.88. For civilian casualties there were too few observations (7) so the regressions 
produced insignificant estimates. Thus, the regression in method 3 justifies the rule of thumb used in method 2. In this table, we 
show two counts based on methods 1 and 2, with the same rule of thumb applied to both civilian and military casualties. 
Other Notes: Germany total includes Austrian casualties. According to some sources Austrian military deaths were 280,000 and 
military wounded were 350,000, which would be 8% and 7% of the combined Austrian/German total, respectively. USSR total 
does not include an estimated 2 to 2.5 million civilians who died fleeing the Red Army during the Soviet invasion and expulsion 
from today’s Western Poland and Czechoslovakia. China civilian deaths are very rough estimates. It is very doubtful that civilian 
deaths were zero under the Japanese occupation. One website mentions an estimate of 22,000,000 civilian deaths which is of 
“doubtful accuracy”; another has an implausibly low figure of 115,000. Furthermore, the military casualties are only those of the 
Chinese Nationalists and do not include those of the Communists. Another source estimates 11 million civilian dead due to 
Japanese occupations in Asia, although this includes countries other than China, e.g. Burma. Based on the latter figure we make a 
rough estimate of 10 million civilian dead in China. For this reason, our 5% GDP loss for China should be considered a very 
rough upper bound. Poland’s figures are subject to disagreement; our figures may be low; Bullock estimates military deaths at 
850,000.   49 
Data Appendix 
 
This appendix provides a more detailed description of the source and construction of the data for trade, 
real GDP, GDP per capita, and land area. Details for all other variables are contained in the text.  
  
Bilateral Trade  
  As discussed in the text, trade data for the period 1948-1997 were constructed from the IMF’s 
Direction of Trade (DoT). These data are essentially the same as in Glick and Rose (2002); the data set is 
obtainable  from  http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/RecRes.htm#Software.  The  average  value  of 
bilateral trade between each pair of countries is created by averaging all of the possible trade values 
potentially available (exports from i to j, exports from j to i, imports into i from j, imports into j from i). 
Observations where all four figures have a zero or missing value are dropped from the sample. 
The  primary  source  of  trade  data  for  1870-1947  is  Barbieri  (1996);  her  International  Trade 
Dataset  Version  1.1  can  be  obtained  from  http://pss/la.psu.edu/trd_data.htm.  Since  her  data  measure 
bilateral trade as the sum of exports and imports between each country pair (imports into i into j and into j 
from i) exports), these figures are divided by two to create an average value of trade. When Barbieri data 
are unavailable, bilateral export and import data from Mitchell (1992, 1993, 1998) for selected countries 
with their main trading partners are used. As with the DoT trade data used for the 1948-97 period, 
bilateral trade for each country pair is constructed from the Mitchell data by averaging all of the possible 
trade values potentially available. Remaining data gaps are filled where possible from López-Córdova and 
Meissner (2003). 
The Barbieri trade data are expressed in millions of current U.S. dollars. López-Córdova and 
Meissner’s trade are expressed in real 1990 U.S. dollars and were converted into nominal dollar terms 
using the U.S. consumer price index. The Mitchell data, which are expressed in current local currency 
terms, were converted into current dollar with the official exchange rate series from Global Financial Data 
(GFD), with exceptions noted below. 
Argentina: Official rate from Mitchell (1993) is used through 1910. Data from 1911 on comes 
from  Gerardo  della  Paolera,  Alan  M.  Taylor  and  Carlos  G.  Bózzoli,  “Historical  Statistics,”  in  della 
Paolera and Taylor,  eds., A  New  Economic  History  of  Argentina  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University 
Press, 2003). 
Bulgaria: French Franc rate is used while Bulgaria was in the Latin Monetary Union (1880-1898, 
1906-1911). An average of the 1898 and 1906 exchange rates is used for the intervening years. The 1911 
rate is used for 1912 and 1913. The official Bulgarian Lev rate from GFD is used from 1920 onward. 
Chile: For all years, the data comes from Juan Braun et al., “Economía Chilena 1810-1995: 
Estadísticas  Históricas,”  Documento  de  Trabajo  no.  187,  Pontificia  Universidad  Católica  de  Chile, 
Instituto de Economía (Enero), Santiago (January 2000). 
China: Trade figures for 1905-1932 in Mitchell (1998) converted from Haikwan tael into dollars 
using exchange rate from GFD. Figures for 1933-1938 converted into yuan at exchange rate of 1 tael = 
0.72 yuan, and the yuan/dollar exchange rate from GFD then used for conversion into dollars.  
Colombia: Exchange rate implicit from gold content from GFD used while Colombia was on 
gold standard (1871-1885, 1907-1913). For the years 1886 through 1906, we used the average of the 1885 
and 1907 exchange rates; for the years 1914-1918 we used the average of the 1913 and 1919 exchange 
rates. The peso exchange rate from GFD was used from 1919 on.  
Ghana: U.K. Pound exchange rate is used. 
Greece: French Franc rate from GFD is used while Greece was in the Latin Monetary Union 
(1870-1876). Exchange rate figures for 1880-89 come from Michael Bordo. Figures for 1901-1945 are 
from GFD; the DOT rate for 1948 is used for 1946 and 1947.  
Romania: French Franc rate from GFD was used while Romania was in the Latin Monetary 
Union (until 1914).  
Serbia: French Franc rate from GFD used   50 
Uruguay: Data for 1885-. comes from GFD; the exchange rate for the years 1874-1884 is set 
equal to the 1885 rate. 
Lastly, exchange rate data from the DoT for 1948 is used for 1946 and 1947 for the following 
countries: Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, South Africa, Switzerland, Turkey. 
Occasionally missing Barbieri observations are left unfilled even when data from Mitchell or 
López-Córdova and Meissner are available, because the data do not align well. Furthermore, in a limited 
number of instances the Barbieri observations were replaced (“overwritten”) with data from Mitchell or 
López-Córdova  and  Meissner,  due  to  apparent  inconsistencies  in  Barbieri’s  figures.  A  list  of  these 
instances is available upon request. After data from the various sources for the 1870-1947 period were 
merged, the pre-1948 dataset is converted into 1985 dollars using the U.S. CPI index and then spliced 
together with the 1948-1997 data.  
 
GDP and GDP per capita 
  As discussed in the text, real GDP and GDP per capita data (in constant 1985 dollars) for the 
1948–97 period are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, the Penn World 
Table (PWT) Mark 5.6, Maddison (1995; 2001), and from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. 
These data are essentially the same as in Glick and Rose (2002), with the general exception that we use 
Maddison data to fill in observations for 1948 and 1949.  
For  the  1870–1947  period  the  data  primarily  come  from  Maddison  (1995;  2001)  and  are 
supplemented  by  information  from  Mitchell  (1992,  1993,  1998)  and  individual  country  sources,  as 
described below. In general, real GDP data in national currency units from the supplementary sources are 
converted  first  into  the  real  1990  dollar  terms  reported  by  Maddison  using  the  ratio  of  figures  for 
overlapping  year(s).  GDP  per  capita  is  then  calculated  using  population  series  implicit  in  the 
supplementary source’s GDP and GDP per capita data. After adjusting for border changes (see below) 
and using the U.S. CPI to put into 1985 dollar terms, the 1870-1947 series are then linked to the 1948-
1997  series  using  the  average  ratio  of  overlapping  observations  for  1948-1952  (the  availability  of 
Maddison data beyond 1948 allows this overlap).  
Further details of the use of supplementary data sources is provided below: 
  Argentina: Figures for 1875-1899 are taken from Gerardo della Paolera, Alan M. Taylor, and 
Carlos G. Bózzoli, “Historical Statistics”, in della Paolera and Taylor, eds., A New Economic History of 
Argentina (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
  Austria-Hungary: GDP and GDP per capital figures for 1870-1913 come from Max-Stephan 
Schulze,  “Patterns  of  Growth  and  Stagnation  in  the  Late  Nineteenth-Century  Hapsburg  Economy,” 
European Review of Economic History 4:3 (2000). Maddison provides GDP data for Austria and Hungary 
separately for 1913 within their 1990 borders. These data points were scaled up by the ratio of each 
country’s population within 1913 borders to its population within 1990 borders and then added together to 
give a Madison-based GDP estimate for Austria-Hungary in 1913. The Schulz GDP series was then 
rescaled by its ratio in 1913 to this Maddison figure. GDP for 1914-1917 were imputed from the (real) 
GDP figures for Austria within its 1990 borders in Maddison, scaled up by the ratio of Austria Hungary’s 
GDP to Austria’s GDP in 1913. Real GDP per capita was computed using the population series implicit 
in Schulze’s data for 1870-1913; for 1914-1917, we rescaled Maddison’s population data for Austria 
(within its 1990 border) by the ratio of Schulze’s population figure in 1913 to Maddison’s figure for 
Austria within its 1913 border  
  Brazil:  Figures  for  1880-1899  come  from  Michael  Bordo  and  Hugh  Rockoff,  “The  Gold 
Standard as a ‘Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval,’” NBER Working Paper no. 5340 (November 
1996). 
  Chile: Figures for 1870-1899 are taken from Juan Braun et al., “Economía Chilena 1810-1995: 
Estadísticas  Históricas,”  Documento  de  Trabajo  no.  187,  Pontificia  Universidad  Católica  de  Chile, 
Instituto de Economía (Enero), Santiago (January 2000).   51 
  Cuba: Figures for 1903-1949 come from Mitchell (1993), where data on GDP (pp. 750, 755) and 
population (p. 58) are presented. Since the Cuban peso is pegged one to one to the U.S. dollar, the U.S. 
price deflator is used to convert Mitchell’s peso series into 1990 dollars.  
  Ecuador: Figures for 1939-1954 come from Mitchell (1993), which provides data for GDP (p. 
765) and population (p. 58).  
  Egypt:  GDP  data for 1886-1945  are  taken  from  Tarik  M.  Yousef, “Egypt’s  Growth  Record 
Under Economic Liberalism, 1885-1950: A Reassessment Using New GDP Estimates,” Review of Income 
and Wealth 48: 561-579 (December 2002). GDP per capita is calculated using Yousef’s GDP series and 
population data from Mitchell (1998, p. 47). 
  Greece: GDP figures for 1927 and 1928 come from Michael Bordo. GDP per capita is calculated 
using Maddison’s population series. 
  Hungary: GDP data for 1942 and 1943 come from Mitchell (1992, p. 894). Population data is 
from Maddison.  
  India:  Population  and  GDP  per  capita  data  for  1873-1899  are  taken  from  Moni Mukherjee, 
National Income of India, Trends and Structure (Calcutta: Statistical Publishing Society, 1969). The 
implicit GDP series is computed from these data, converted into real 1990 dollars in the standard manner, 
and then divided by population to generate real GDP per capita. 
  Mexico: Figures for 1895-1899 come from Mitchell (1993, p. 749). 
  Paraguay: GDP and population data for 1938-1954 come from Mitchell (1993, pp. 767, 63-64, 
respectively).  
  Phillippines: GDP figures for 1946-1949 are taken from Mitchell (1998, p. 1012); population 
data are from Maddison. 
  Portugal: Figures for 1880-1914 come from Bordo and Rockoff (1996). 
Soviet  Union:  The  average  of  GDP  for  1940  and  1945  from  Maddison  is  used  to  fill  in 
observations for 1941-1944; the average of per capita GDP for 1940 and 1946 from Maddison is used to 
fill in 1941-1945.  
  Spain: Figures for 1870-1954 come from Leandro Prados de la Escosura, El progreso económico 
de España: 1850-2000 (Madrid: Fundación BBVA, 2002). 
  Uruguay: Figures for 1870-1954 are taken from Luis Bértola et al., El PBI de Uruguay 1870-
1936 y otras estimaciones (Montevideo: 1999). GDP and GDP per capita data are given in index level 
form, with 1913 = 100. To convert into real 1990 dollars, the index series is multiplied by Maddison’s 
GDP value in 1913. Likewise, the implicit population index series from Bértola et al is computed and 
converted into actual population terms using Maddison’s 1913 population value. These population figures 
are then used to calculate GDP per capita. 
  Maddison (1995) reports GDP and GDP per capita series based on 1990 borders. We adjust these 
data  to  take  account  of  the  effects  of  historical  changes  in  borders  on  economic  activity,  under  the 
assumption  (typically  employed  by  Maddison)  that  such  effects  are  proportionate  to  differences  in 
population. Maddison’s Appendix H provides population figures for selected countries in 1913 and 1939 
for the borders existing at the time as well as for their 1990 borders. We adjust his GDP series based on 
1990 borders by using the ratio of population within the 1913 and 1939 borders to the population within 
1990 borders. (These adjustments are made only if the population difference was more than 3 percent.) 
Adjustments based on the 1913 ratios were applied over the 1870-1917 period for Austria-Hungary, 
Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Romania, Russia, Serbia/Yugoslavia, and the United 
Kingdom. Adjustments based on the 1939 ratios were applied to the 1918-1944 period for Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia,  Germany,  Italy,  Poland,  Romania,  Russia/Soviet  Union,  and  Serbia/Yugoslavia. 
Adjustments were also made for border changes affecting Korea in 1945, India in 1948, and Pakistan in 
1972.  
  GDP per capita figures generally are assumed unaffected by these border adjustments, with the 
exception of Germany and Italy, for whom Maddison reports separate per capita figures for 1913, 1939, 
and 1990 borders.  
   52 
Land Area 
Land area figures were taken from the World Factbook (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence 
Agency,  2000).  For  the  period  1870-1917  land  area  data  for  Albania,  Austria-Hungary,  Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Russia/USSR, 
Sweden, and Turkey were obtained from the online replica of the Encyclopedia Britannica, 11
th edition 
(Cambridge: University Press, 1911). Figures for the 1918-1944 period for Albania, Austria, Belgium, 
Czechoslovakia,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Finland,  France,  Greece,  Hungary,  Korea,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Turkey, USSR (Russia), Germany, and Yugoslavia are 
taken from the New World Looseleaf Atlas (New York: Hammond, 6
th edition, no date, circa 1920s). 
 